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INTRODUCTION

As recently as 1985, a target corporation's response to a hostile tender offer was "virtually unassailable"' under the business
judgment rule.' In the past few years there have been many
changes in the world of corporate takeovers, but many have been
merely changes of degree: large acquisitions have become even
larger; inventive offensive and defensive takeover tactics have
1 Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between Judicialand Legislative Notions of Target Mlanagement Conduct, 13J. CORP. L. 35 (1988).
2 The business judgment rule, of course, presumes the validity of most actions
of a board of directors and protects those actions from second-guessing by the
courts. A leading formulation of the rule provides:
In the absence of a showing of bad faith on the part of the directors or
of a gross abuse of discretion the business judgment of the directors will
not be interfered with by the courts ....
The acts of directors are presumptively acts taken in good faith and inspired for the best interests of
the corporation, and a minority stockholder who challenges their bona
fides has the burden of proof.
Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 157-58, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (1966) (citations omitted). See generally H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS 661-63 (3d ed. 1983) (discussing business judgment rule); Wander
& LeCoque, Boardroom Jitters: Corporate Control Transactions and Today s Business Judgment Rule, 42 Bus. LAW. 29 (1986) (judicial decisions have begun to scrutinize the
actions of corporate directors); Arsht, The BusinessJudgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 93 (1979) (business judgment rule is misunderstood today).
3 Cash tender offers amounted to less than $200 million in 1960, yet grew to
almost $1 billion by 1966. Senate Hearings on S. 510 before the Subcomm. on Securities of
Senate Conim. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1967). In 1988, the
aggregate dollar value of tender offers peaked at $153.9 billion. Tender Offer Update:
1989, 23 MERGERS & ACQuisIrIONS L. REP. 25 (1989).
In the 1960s, most deals were relatively small. But by 1981, single deals
topped $6 billion. For example, Du Pont bought Conco for about $6.8 billion.
MERGERS AND AcQuISmTIONs ALMANAC & INDEX 8 (1982). By the late 1980s, multibillion dollar deals were commonplace. A ANew Strain of Merger lania, Bus. WK. Mar.
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been replaced by a steady stream of even more creative strategies; 4 and the cast of players eager to grab a piece of the action
has grown larger and larger. 5 But one change has been qualitative; the courts no longer give anything close to "complete deference" to the business judgments of target boards in hostile
takeovers, unless the boards scrupulously follow established
structural and procedural guidelines. 6 Even then, substantive
court review often occurs. For better or for worse, the courts,
primarily the Delaware courts, 7 have abandoned the nearly conclusive deference once given to the business judgments of target
boards and have thereby largely reshaped the offensive and defensive tactics and procedures invoked in hostile corporate
takeovers.
A primary result of this evolution in takeover strategies is a
new emphasis on the importance of providing alternatives for
target shareholders to consider. Increasingly, those alternatives
are provided not by traditional white knights,' but by the corpo21, 1988, at 122. Almost any corporation of any size is currently subject to takeover. Smith, Size Alone No Longer Offers Takeover Immunity, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1988,
at C1, col. 4 (S.W. ed.), as illustrated by the 1988-1989 purchase of RJR/Nabisco by
KKR for over $25 billion. Anders, RJR Finale Will Send Money Coursing, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 9, 1989, at CI, col. 3 (S.W. ed.).
4 Many of those often colorfully named strategies, such as poison pills, will be
discussed in this article. The terms will be defined as they arise. As long as corporate attorneys and investment bankers are being paid hundreds and even thousands
of dollars an hour in tender offer battles, they will turn their creative minds to the
invention of new tactics and strategies. See Stewart & Hertzberg, Investment Bankers
Feed a Merger Boom and Pick Up Fat Fees, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1986, at 1, col. 6 (S.W.
ed.) (noting that many believe investment bankers' search for fees to be a main
factor in fueling takeover boom).
5 Herman & Lowenstein, The Efficiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers, KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS, THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER, (J. Coffee, L. Lowenstein &
S. Rose-Ackerman, ed. 1988) [hereinafter KRT] (there are now "sharks" in the
business of putting companies "into play" and "wolf packs" of big investors willing
to fund any takeovers promising substantial returns).
6 E.g., In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 10350 (Del. Ch. Dec.
30, 1988) (striking down lock-up option and other provisions where they were used
to inhibit rather than promote auction); Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882,
889 (6th Cir. 1986) (enjoining a board which simply rubber-stamped a management-sponsored buy-out and did not run a fair auction).
7 "Delaware is far and away the preeminent state in terms of the number of
publicly held corporations incorporated there ....
It also has an unusually welldeveloped case law in the corporate area." W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 101 (6th ed. 1988).

8 A "white knight," of course, is "[a] third company solicited by a takeover target to outbid the original aggressor, because the white knight is more acceptable to
the target than the original aggressor." J. BROOKS, THE TAKEOVER GAME 375
(1987).
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rate management itself in the form of restructurings, 9 including
leveraged recapitalizations,' ° and management-sponsored leveraged buy-outs (MBO's).l" The increasing number of leveraged
recaps, MBO's and the like constitute a positive development for
target shareholders1 2 but raise a myriad of difficult issues.
This article undertakes five tasks. First, it will trace the development of the business judgment rule in the takeover context
as refined primarily by the Delaware courts illustrating that the
harsh tactics of yesteryear, tactics that were designed to stop hostile tender offers in their tracks, have been largely replaced by
kinder, gentler defensive tactics featuring primary concern with
producing valuable alternatives from which shareholders will be
free to choose.' 3
Second, it will explain and illustrate the most popular of the
new defensive tactics which exemplify the ideal of the new legal
regime: corporate restructuring, leveraged recapitalization, and
MBO's. 4
Third, the article will summarize and analyze the case law
developed by the Delaware courts in the litigation over defensive
uses of restructurings, recaps, and MBO's. 15 A recent profusion
of litigation has led to many new rules and some inconsistencies.
This section will also highlight various issues that the lower Delaware courts have had much difficulty resolving.
Fourth, the article will summarize one of the most important
decisions in the tender offer area since 1985, Mills Acquisition Co.
v. Macmillan, Inc. (Macmillan II).16 In so doing, the article will explain the answers that Macmillan II provides to important, yet
9 See infra notes 108 to 134 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 109 to 127 and accompanying text.
I I See infra notes 135 to 139 and accompanying text.
12 See Johnson, supra note 1, at 38 (Courts, by encouraging auctions, have encouraged target managements to restructure and leverage companies resulting in
target company shareholders being "greatly enriched.").
Whether or not these tremendous benefits to target shareholders translate into
benefits for the economy and society at large is another question altogether. Debates on various issues raised by the current tender offer boom tend to gloss over
this distinction. Id. at 71. See Johnson, State Takeover Statutes; Constitutionality, Community and Heresy, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1051, 1052 (1988);Johnson & Millon,
Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 Mici. L. REv. 846, 856 (1989).
13 See infra notes 18 to 107 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 108 to 139 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 140 to 221 and accompanying text.
16 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988), discussed infra at notes 222 to 263 and accompanying text.
Macmillan has been called "the most significant decision by the Delaware
Supreme Court" in nearly two years. Cohen, Delaware High Court Rules a Company
10
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previously unresolved issues raised by the application of the business judgment rule in the context of restructurings, recapitalizations, and defensive MBO's.
Finally, the article will analyze and evaluate Macmillan II,
suggesting that, for the most part, Macmillan H's holdings were
both clarifying and correct.' 7 While Macmillan II has not answered all questions in the area, its holdings are a welcome and
beneficial addition to one of the most important and rapidly
changing bodies of law in the country.
II.

EVOLUTION OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) is certainly a
major factor in the tender offer game. Its rules, promulgated
pursuant to authority granted by the Williams Act" s help shape
the strategies and tactics of tender offerors and targets. 1 9 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court decisions in Santa Fe Industries v.
Green2 ° and Schreiber v. Burlington Northern2 ' effectively ceded jurisdiction over such matters to the state courts to interpret the
scope of the business judgment rule. Therefore, attention is
turned to this evolving body of state law.
A.

Pre-Norlin Law

The business judgment rule, as typically formulated and applied, means that corporate shareholders having elected a board
of directors will have no more control over most of the decisions
of the managers than the Board of Regents of Indiana University
Can't Use 'Lock-Up'Just to Stop a Suitor, Wall St. J., May 8, 1989, at B2, col. 3 (S.W.
ed.) (quoting Arthur Fleischer, Jr.).
17 See infra notes 264-371 and accompanying text.
18 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-78m(e), 78n(d)-78n(f) (1986).
19 As an example, when the Delaware Supreme Court approved a discriminatory
self-tender offer as a defensive tactic in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946 (Del. 1985), the SEC immediately outlawed the practice with its "All Holders
Rule." See Amendments to Tender Offer Rules-All Holders and Best-Price, Exchange Act Release No. 23,421 [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 84,016 (July 11, 1986).
20 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that mere breach of fiduciary duty, absent misleading statements or omissions, was not a violation of Sec. 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act and therefore claim was relegated to state courts).
21 472 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that mere unfair treatment, absent fraud, was not
"manipulative" within the meaning of Section 14(e) of the Williams Act and accordingly relegated claim to the state courts).
The importance of state takeover law was also heightened, obviously, when the
United States Supreme Court approved a second generation state antitakeover law
in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987), thus bringing
state legislatures as well as state courts into the debate over tender offer policies.
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has over the selection of Bobby Knight's starting five in any given
game.2 2 In general, the business judgment rule has been applied
to protect all corporate decisions including choice of strategy and
tactics in meeting hostile bids for corporate control.
As the tide of hostile tender offers rose in the 1960's, 1970's,
and early 1980's, 2 3 it was met with a variety of extreme defensive
measures designed to preserve the independence of target corporations and to defeat outright the aggressive intentions of the
tender offerors. Many of these defensive tactics were colorfully
named. For example, "shark repellent" amendments to corporate charters sought to bar an offeror from buying a controlling
interest in the target or, failing that, to block the offeror from
gaining operational control. 24 "Golden parachutes" were
designed to provide protection for target management, at the
same time, making it much more expensive for a hostile offeror
to complete an acquisition. 2 1 "Cyanide capsules" were designed
to accelerate a target's debt payment or force renegotiation of its
important labor and supplies contracts should a change of control occur. 2 6 The "Pac-Man" defense was a retaliatory tender offer for control of the would-be shark.2 7 Sale of a "crownjewel ' 2 8
was frequently one aspect of "scorched earth" policies aimed at
leaving the corporation so stripped down that it would no longer
be attractive to acquirers. 2 9 Even "corporate suicide," complete
22 Couric, Takeover Defense Costs Insured, Legal Times of Wash., Nov. 3, 1980, at 3,
col. 2 (quoting tender offer expense insurer stating that business judgment rule has
led to "almost complete deference" by the courts to target management decisions).
23 See supra note 3.
24 See, e.g., Burrough, Tenneco, A Rumored Takeover Target, ProposingSweeping Defensive Measures, Wall St. J., Mar. 29, 1985, at 8, col. 3; Vartanian & Ledig, Thrift Institutions Adopting More Shark Repellents, Legal Times, Oct. 1, 1984, at 12, col. 1;Bancroft,

MCI Limits Shareholder Powers in the British Fashion, Legal Times, Feb. 28, 1983, at 14,
col. 1.
25 See, e.g., Steinberg & Seto, The Burnishing of Golden Parachutes, 12 DIRECTORS &
OFFICERS 24 (Winter 1988); Riger, Taking a New Look at the Validity of Golden Para-

chuteAgreements, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 16, 1985, at 26, col. 1; Herzel & Collig, Controversial
"Golden Parachutes" Offer Protection, Legal Times, Aug. 23, 1982, at 10, col. 1.
26 See, e.g., Hertzberg, Takeover Targets Find Loading Up on Debt Can Fend Off Raiders, Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1985, at 1, col. 6 (S.W. ed.).
27 See, e.g., Feit, Pac-Man Defense Upsets Majority Holder Rule, Nat'l L.J., May 23,
1988, at 33, col. 1; Herzel & Schmidt, SEC is Probing "Double Pac-Man' Takeover
Defense, Legal Times, Apr. 18, 1983, at 27, col. 1; Masters, Use of "Pac-Man Tactic in
Takeovers Raises Hackles, Legal Times, Sept. 27, 1982, at 7, col. 1.
28 A "crown jewel" is a corporation's most desirable asset, division or subsidi-

ary. By selling that part of itself, a corporation may abate the hostile offeror's interest. Prentice, Target Board Abuse of Defensive Tactics: Can Federal Law be Mobilized to
Overcome the BusinessJudgment Rule?, 8J. CORP. L. 337, 343 (1983).
29 See Herzel & Schmidt, Shareholders Can Benefit from Sale of "Crown Jewels "',
Legal
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liquidation of the company, was occasionally considered as a
means of defeating a hostile bid.3 0
The business judgment rule's loose rein coupled with the
natural desire of corporate managers to keep their jobs led to
some spectacular instances of subordination of shareholder interests. 3' A favorite example is Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. ,32
where a threatened tender offer by Carter Hawley Hale (CHH)
induced Marshall Field's management to buy stores the company
arguably did not need but which competed with CHH. Antitrust
suits were a long favored method of responding to a hostile takeover, 3 3 but creation of an antitrust problem where none existed
before was a slightly more extreme approach. It was also an effective approach and it caused CHH to drop the idea of making
an offer. The numbers quickly demonstrate why Marshall Field
shareholders subsequently sued their board of directors. Marshall Field stock had been trading at around $28 per share before
the contemplated offer, which was to be at $42 per share. After
CHH rescinded the offer, Marshall Field stock, now saddled with
the extra burden of the unneeded stores, dropped below $20 per
share. Over a stinging dissent by Judge Cudahy,3 4 the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rather routinely applied the business judgment rule as an almost talismanic shield for the target
board's actions. 5
Times, Oct. 24, 1983, at 33, col. 1; Riley, Takeover Decision May Spur Tactical Shift,
Nat'l L.J., Jan. 20, 1986, at 3, col. 1.
30 Such an attempt was enjoined as too severe a defensive tactic in Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
31 Target shareholders are typically more than willing to sell their shares at a
profit when a tender offer is made. Klein, A Brief Against Managements That Fight Off
Tender Offers, FORTUNE, Mar. 12, 1979, at 160 ("[E]very analysis I've seen shows that
most stockholders are happy to sell out at a profit").
32 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
33 E.g., Berman v. Gerber Prods., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1326 (W.D. Mich. 1978);
Anaconda Co. v. Crane, 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1216-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
The popularity of the antitrust defense has been lessened by various rulings
that target corporations had no standing to challenge hostile takeovers on antitrust
grounds. E.g., Central Nat'l Bank v. Rainbolt, 720 F.2d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir.
1983); A.D.M. Corp. v. Sigma Instruments, Inc., 628 F.2d 753, 754 (1st Cir. 1980).
See generally Note, Antitrust Standing of Target Corporations to Enjoin Hostile Takeovers
Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1039 (1987).
34 Panter, 646 F.2d at 299 ("I emphatically disagree that the business judgment
rule should clothe directors, battling blindly to fend off a threat to their control,
with an almost irrebuttable presumption of sound business judgment, prevailing
over everything but the elusive hobgoblins of fraud, bad faith or abuse of
discretion.").
35 Id. at 293-95. Many other cases could be cited to support the proposition that
the business judgment rule in the 1970s and early 1980s at least presented a
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Norlin Signals a Change

So long as target boards of directors were given virtually untrammelled authority to act to defeat hostile tender offers,
would-be offerors decided that their only hope of overcoming
these extreme defenses was with more extreme tactics of their
own, meeting fire with fire. Thus were born such extreme offen6
sive strategies as the front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer,1
the bust-up takeover, 37 the bootstrap offer,3 8 and the general use
of junk bonds in financing offers," which served to put virtually
any corporation in America "into play." 4 These extreme tactics
led to counter escalations on the defensive side, 4 including most
"nearly insurmountable obstacle" to any challenge to target management defense
tactics. See, e.g., Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980);
Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535
F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Il. 1982). See also Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 926 (1979) ("business purpose test
poses a nearly insurmountable obstacle for plaintiffs challenging defensive
tactics").
36 A two-tiered, front-end loaded tender offer "typically [consists of] a cash offer
that produces control, followed by acquisition of the remaining equity [through a
merger] at a lower price for debt or equity securities of the acquiring company." L.
Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION

499 (2d ed. 1988). See generally

Prentice, Front-End Loaded, Two-Tiered Tender Offers: An Examination of the Counterproductive Effects of a Mighty Offensive Weapon, 39 CASE W. RES. 389 (1988) (explaining
the development of the front-end loaded, two-tiered offer and its impact on federal
and state law).
37 A bust-up takeover occurs when the offeror can afford to purchase the target
only if it can, upon gaining control, start "busting up" the target, selling its component parts to pay the purchase price. R. PRENTICE, LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND SECURITIES REGULATION 719 (1987). See generally Lipton, Greenmail, BustUp Takeovers-A Discussion Memorandum, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 1984, at 1, col. 3 (stating
that greenmail and bust-up takeovers are inherently bad); Mishkin, Greenmail, BustUp Takeovers-Comment on the Lipton Proposal, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 18, 1984, at 1, col. 3
(agreeing with Lipton that greenmail is bad, but questioning his premise that bustup takeovers are inherently bad).
38 One method of making a bootstrap offer is for a "shark" which cannot truly
afford to buy control of a target to make a very lucrative offer for, say, 15% of the
target's shares. It is likely that the target's shareholders will be so eager to have at
least some percentage of their shares purchased at the premium price that they will
tender over 50% of the target's shares. [he shark can then go to potential lenders
and point out that control of the target is "there for the taking" and, in effect, use
the target's own assets as collateral. R. PRENTICE, supra note 37, at 718.
39 A "junk bond" is a high yield, non-investment grade security that, in recent
years, has provided virtually unlimited funds for hostile tender offers, leveraged
buy-outs, and corporate restructurings. Pioneered by the recently-indicted Michael
Milken of Drexel Burnham Lambert, junk bonds have transformed the takeover
business. See C. BRUCK, THE PREDATOR'S BALL (1988).
40 Bruck, The World of Business, NEW YORKER, May 8, 1989, at 81.
41 One of the authors of this article has recently argued that the apparently coercive nature of the front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer led not only to inven-
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importantly Martin Lipton's invention of the "poison pill," 4 2 a
defensive shield of truly extreme proportions.4 3
Just as inventive legal minds were reaching the "Dr.
Strangelove" stage, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals finally
recognized the conflict of interest of target boards that commentators had been highlighting. 44 More importantly, the court actually second guessed a board in a particular case, Norlin Corp. v.
Rooney Pace, Inc.4 5 In response to an imminent tender offer by
Piezo Electric Products in conjunction with Rooney Pace, Inc.,
the Norlin board of directors created an employee stock option
plan (ESOP) and transferred enough shares to it and to Norlin
subsidiaries to account for 49% of all outstanding Norlin shares.
Because the board of directors controlled the shares held by both
the ESOP and the subsidiaries, a successful tender offer was impossible at any premium.
In affirming the trial judge's grant of a preliminary injunction, the Second Circuit noted that the precipitous timing of the
transfers of voting control to the target directors with no rationale other than a determination to avoid a takeover at all costs
made it clear that the directors were motivated by a desire to retain control over corporate affairs. 46 The court rejected the view
that a target board, having "conclude[d] that an actual or anticition and court approval of increasingly extreme defensive tactics, but also to more
stringent state and federal regulation of the tender offer process. See Prentice, supra
note 36 at 405-10, 424-33.
42 Poison pill preferred stock is typically issued as a pro rata dividend to all holders of a corporation's common stock. It carries special redemption and conversion
privileges that are triggered when a hostile offeror purchases a certain percentage
(e.g., 33% or 51%) of a target's shares. There are many ways the pill can be structured but it might, for example, upon being triggered allow target shareholders to
buy $200 worth of the target's shares for $100, thus diluting the holdings of the
offeror. A good description of various types of poison pills is contained in Damson,
Pence & Stone, Poison Pill Defensive Measures, 42 Bus. LAw. 422, 426-31 (1987). See
Martin & Struxness, A Review of Current Developments in Shareholders Rights Plans, 2
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS L. REP. 234 (1989); Flood, Per Se Illegalitv of Flip-In Pills, 1
MERGERS & ACQUIsITIONs L. REP. 6 (1988); Note, Protecting ShareholdersAgainst Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1964
(1985).
43 The SEC has described the poison pill "as the most potent defensive tactic
available against hostile takeovers that does not require approval by shareholders."
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, THE EFFECTS
OF POISON PILLS ON THE WEALTH OF TARGET SHAREHOLDERS 2 (Oct. 23, 1986).
44 See, e.g., Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 35, at 915; Gelfond & Sebastian,
Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in a Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. REV.
403 (1980).
45 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
46 Id. at 265.
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pated takeover attempt is not in the best interests of the company, . .. may take any action necessary to forestall acquisitive

moves." The court stated:
The business judgment rule does indeed require the board to
analyze carefully any perceived threat to the corporation and
to act appropriately when it decides that the interests of the
company and its shareholders might be jeopardized ...
[H]owever, the duty of loyalty requires the board to demonstrate that any actions it does take are fair and reasonable.
We
47
conclude that Norlin has failed to make that showing.
The actions of the Norlin board were truly heavy-handed, yet
little in previous case law warned the board that it should, at the
very least, have paid more attention to appearances. The actions of
target boards, no matter how extreme or clumsy, had almost always
been rubber-stamped by the courts. Norlin signalled that a change
was in the wind. However, no such change in the area of corporate
law is truly significant until its breeze is felt in the jurisdiction of
Delaware.
C.

The Delaware Response: Unocal's Two-Step Test

In January of 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court stunned
the corporate world with its decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom.4 8
Applying a gross negligence standard, the court held that the
business judgment rule's protection was not available to a board
of directors that had not informed itself prior to approving the
sale of the company. 49 Given that failure, even the presumption
of good faith was insufficient to grant business judgment rule
protections to the board.50
The true significance of the Van Gorkom decision continues to
be debated. 5 ' But for purposes of this article, its importance lies
in the fact that even though it did not involve a hostile tender
Id. at 265-66.
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
49 Id. at 873.
50 Id. at 893.
51 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127 (1988) (arguing that Smith v. Van Gorkom was "not, at bottom, a business judgment case ....
[but] a takeover case" which did "not pose a serious threat of liability to officers
and directors"); Block & Hoff, 'Business Judgment': Van Gorkom Revisited, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 13, 1987, at 5, col. 1 (concluding that the case did not seriously damage the
business judgment rule in that defensive actions will continue to be protected if
directors follow minimal procedural requirements and act in good faith); Herzel &
Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAw.
1187 (1986) (assailing Van Gorkom as an assault on the business judgment rule).
47
48
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offer and its attendant target-generated defensive tactics, Van
Gorkom illustrated that the Delaware Supreme Court believed that
the sale of a corporation was an important matter to shareholders
and that the judgments of Delaware boards of directors in such
transactions were no longer sacrosanct.5 2 These points became
clear in the hostile tender offer arena just a few months later in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. ," a case which has become arguably the most important ever decided regarding the application of the business judgment rule to target defensive tactics.
Unocal arose out of classic circumstances. On one side was
infamous raider T. Boone Pickens and his Mesa Petroleum Co.5 4
On the other side was Unocal Corporation, quite often a target in
such battles. Already owning 13% of Unocal's shares, Mesa
weighed in with a two-tier, front-end loaded offer for 37% at $54
per share cash. The second tier was to be a back-end merger
wherein shareholders would receive not cash but highlysubordinated junk bond securities that Mesa valued at $54 but
55
which were quite arguably worth less.
Unocal's board of eight outside and six inside directors accepted the judgments of two investment bankers that the Mesa
bid was inadequate and that Unocal's liquidation value was at
least $60 per share.5 6 Several defensive alternatives were proposed, including a self-tender for 37% of the shares at a price of
$72, which would have saddled the corporation with substantial
debt and which would have reduced exploratory drilling but
would have nevertheless maintained independence. The outside
directors met independently with financial advisors and attorneys
and then rejected the Mesa bid and ultimately launched the selftender with an interesting feature, the offer to repurchase was
not extended to Mesa. 5 7
The Delaware Supreme Court, reviewing the vice-chancel52 Lesser, Directors, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 17, col. 1 ("courts are scrutinizing the decision-making process [in takeovers] with increasing vigor").
53 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
54 The Delaware Supreme Court was not at all kind to Pickens, labeling him "a
corporate raider with a national reputation as a 'greenmailer.' " Id. at 956. A
"greenmailer," of course, is one who buys a significant amount of a target's shares,
not truly intending to buy control but hoping to "rattle the sword" and thereby
convince target management to repurchase his shares at a premium. See Gilson,
Drafting an Effective Greenmail Prohibition, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 329 (1988); Comment,
Greenmail: Can the Abuses Be Stopped?, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1271 (1986).
55 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949.
56 Id. at 950.
57 Id. at 951. The discriminatory self-tender offer has been termed a "lollipop"
because it provides something sweet for the normal target shareholders, but is a
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lor's decision to enjoin the self-tender offer, confronted the issue
of whether "the Unocal board [had] the power and duty to oppose a takeover threat it reasonably perceived to be harmful to
the corporate enterprise, and if so, [was] its action ... entitled to
the protection of the business judgment rule." 5 8 The court commenced its discussion with a basic summary of the powers, responsibilities, and legal protections of directors. A quick review
of Delaware's corporate statutes satisfied the court that "in the
broad context of corporate governance, including issues of fundamental corporate change, a board of directors is not a passive
instrumentality. ' 59 Further, the court noted that when a board's
powers were exercised in the takeover context, the business judgment rule did apply 60 and a court would not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the board's decision could be
"attributed to any rational business purpose. "61
The court, however, quickly recognized limits to the protections provided by the business judgment rule. As the Second
Circuit had done in Norlin, the Delaware high court noted that
"[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter that a board [in the tender
offer context] may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather
than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an
enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may be
conferred." 6 2 In the face of this conflict of interest, the Unocal
opinion set forth a two-part test for judging the defensive actions
of target management.
First, the directors had to show that they had "reasonable
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effec63
tiveness existed because of another person's stock ownership."
Such a burden could be satisfied, the court explained, by showing
good faith and reasonable investigation.6 4 The court also noted
that the board's showing was "materially enhanced" because the
bitter pill for the shark. Leefeldt, A Sweet Way to Foil Takeover Bids, Wall St. J., Sept.
4, 1985, at 24, col. 4 (S.W. ed.).
58 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953.
59 Id. at 954. The court noted that even in traditional areas of corporate change
such as charter amendments, mergers, sales of assets, and dissolution, director action is a prerequisite to final action under the Delaware Corporate Code. Id. at n.8.
60 Id. at 954 (citing Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984)).
61 Id. (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v.Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
62 Id. (emphasis added).
63 Id. at 955 (citing Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (1964)).
64 Id.
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board was comprised of a majority of outside directors.6 5 Second, because the board's powers were not absolute and it did not
have "unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat by any
Draconian means available," 6 6 the defensive measure must have
' 67
been "reasonable in relation to the threat posed.
The court then enumerated several examples of what a target board could properly consider as threats to corporate policy
and effectiveness, including: "inadequacy of the price offered; nature and timing of the offer; questions of illegality; the impact on
'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally); the
risk of nonconsummation; and the quality of securities being offered in the exchange." 68
In Unocal, the selective self-tender offer, which was both innovative and extreme, was held protected by the business judgment rule. The court initially agreed with the target board that a
front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer at an arguably inadequate price sponsored by a "corporate raider with a national reputation as a 'greenmailer,' "69 was coercive, and therefore, a
threat to corporate policy and effectiveness. Next, the court
viewed the self-tender offer as reasonable in relation to the threat
posed because it offered $72 worth of senior debt to the 49% of
its shareholders who might otherwise be forced to accept Mesa's
highly subordinated junk bonds.70
The Unocal two-part test is an intermediate application of the
business judgment rule, lying between the traditional automatic
application of the rule's protection where there is no "omnipresent specter" of a conflict of interest and the even more stringent
test of "intrinsic fairness" applied to the "going private" phenomenon in such cases as Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 72 Although
the wording of the two-part test reveals the potential of substan65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.

(emphasis added).

at 956.
Id. at 956-57.
71 In a "going private" transaction, variously called a "freeze-out," "cash-out,"
or "take-out" merger, minority shareholders are forced to give up their shares of
stock in a corporation to the controlling majority in exchange for cash or securities.
See generally Booth, The New Law of Freeze-Out Mergers, 49 Mo. L. REV. 517 (1984)
(appraising Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) and its
ramifications).
72 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). See Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498
A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985); Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 498 A.2d 1117 (Del. 1985).
70
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tive court review of target board decisions, many commentators
initially viewed the Unocal test as "toothless, ' 73 perhaps because
the result in Unocal was the validation of the specific defensive
tactic used. While early applications of the Unocal test did not
prove too useful,7 1 in 1988 and 1989 the Delaware courts used
the Unocal approach to put real substance into their review of target board defensive tactics.7 5
D.

The Revlon Auction Duty

Before the Unocal test had reached full bloom, the Delaware
Supreme Court added to its scrutiny of target board defensive
tactics a very important facet in the form of the "auction duty"
ruling in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings.7 6 The notion of an auction duty did not spring fully-formed from the RevIon decision. Other courts 77 and several commentators 78 had
supported the notion that defensive tactics which encouraged
higher alternative bids should be treated differently than tactics
which simply blocked hostile offers. Revlon, however, is undeniably the key case.
Revlon arose out of a proposal by Pantry Pride to buy Revlon
stock for a price in the $40-$50 per share range. Partly because
of personal antipathy between the CEO's of the two companies
and partly because the Revlon board considered the bid inadequate, Revlon adopted a poison pill and a self-tender for onesixth of its shares in exchange for various notes, including one73 E.g., Johnson & Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of Target Directors,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 330 (1987).
74 E.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1350-54 (Del. 1985) (upholding poison pill in face of possible coercive offer); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531-37
(Del. 1986) (upholding corporate repurchase of shares so long as done in good
faith following reasonable investigation).
75 See infra notes 140 to 221 and accompanying text.
76 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). See generally Stephenson, Auctions: Companies inPlay
and at Work, 2 20TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 431 (PLI 1988);
Shea, 'Auction' Duties of Directors, Nat'l L.J., June 13, 1988, at 13, col. 1; Note, Corporate Auctions and Directors' Fiduciary Duties: A Third-GenerationBusiness Judgment Rule, 87
MicH. L. REV. 276 (1988) ("Delaware courts have strengthened the standard of
review under the business judgment rule" using the Unocal two-prong test which
has limited relevance in the auction phase context.).
77 For example, in Hanson Trust PLC-ML v. SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264,
274 (2d Cir. 1986), the Second Circuit had alluded to the auction concept, striking
down lock-up options "that effectively preclude bidders from competing with the
optionee bidder."
78 E.g., Oesterle, Target Managersas Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53, 95 (1985); Bebchuk, The Case for
FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1050 (1982).
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tenth of a share of $9 cumulative convertible preferred stock that
Revlon's banker opined would trade at a face value of $100. The
notes carried various covenants limiting Revlon's ability to incur
additional debt, sell assets, or pay dividends unless approved by
non-management directors. Pantry Pride made its first hostile offer at $47.50, subject to financing and redemption of the poison
pill. Revlon recommended rejection of the offer and proceeded
with its self-tender; 87% of the company's shares were tendered,
and some were purchased on a pro rata basis. 79 After the selftender offer was completed, Pantry Pride announced a new allcash, all-shares offer at $42 per share. As maneuvers progressed,
Pantry Pride raised its bid to $50, then to $53, and finally to
$56.25.
In the meantime, it became clear to the Revlon board that
Pantry Pride's determination would ultimately lead to sale of the
company. Therefore, it negotiated with Forstmann Little & Co.
(Forstmann), an investment group, and agreed to a purchase by
Forstmann at $56 per share cash, contingent on a redemption of
the poison pill and waiver of the covenants to the notes so that
portions of Revlon could be sold to pay for the acquisition.
When the deal was announced, the notes stopped trading at $100
and slipped to $87.50, angering bondholders.
Pantry Pride announced that it would bid a fraction higher
than any Forstmann bid, despite the fact that it was not given
access to confidential Revlon information that was being shared
with Forstmann. Nonetheless, the Revlon board continued to resist Pantry Pride and agreed to support Forstmann's bid with: a
lock-up option to purchase two Revlon divisions at a bargain
price if any other bidder succeeded in buying 40% of Revlon; a
"no-shop" provision; ° and a $25 million "good-bye fee."'" In
return, Forstmann agreed to support the par value of the faltering notes by an exchange of new notes. This was a major reason
for the Revlon board's favoring the Forstmann bid, because the
board had been threatened with litigation by angry bondholders.8 2
79

Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177.

80 In a "no-shop" provision, a target promises not to allow another party to

compete with the bidder given the no-shop promise. Sometimes these provisions
allow "window shopping," which means that the target is allowed to talk to other
bidders who initiate contact with the target.
81 A "good-bye" fee is essentially an expenses provision which reimburses a losing bidder for the amounts it spent in pursuing an unsuccessful bid.
82 Id. at 178-79.
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Pantry Pride sued, challenging the various defensive tactics,
and the chancery court ruled against Revlon's board. On appeal,
the Delaware Supreme Court upheld both the adoption of the
poison pill and the self-tender as reasonable in relation to the
threat posed by the initial Pantry Pride offer, which was grossly
inadequate. 8 3 However, when Pantry Pride kept raising its offer
and the board turned to negotiation with Forstmann, the court
concluded that changed circumstances necessitated different
rules by which to judge the board's actions:
[W]hen Pantry Pride increased its offer to $50 per share, and
then to $53, it became apparent to all that the break-up of the
company was inevitable. The Revlon board's authorization
permitting management to negotiate a merger or buyout with
a third party was a recognition that the company was for sale.
The duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation
of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the
company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit. This
significantly altered the board's responsibilities under the Unocal standards. It no longer faced threats to corporate policy
and effectiveness, or to the stockholders' interests, from a
grossly inadequate bid. The directors' role changedfrom defenders of
the corporate bastion to auctioneers chargedwith getting the best pricefor
84
the stockholders at a sale of the company.

In Revlon, the directors forfeited their protection under the
business judgment rule by failing to select the highest possible bid
for shareholders, opting instead to protect bondholders, and
thereby protecting themselves from litigation and creating a conflict
of interest.8 5 The lock-up option, "no-shop" clause, and "goodbye" fees were all struck down because, although not per se illegal,
in this case they impeded rather than promoted the auction of Revlon stock.8 6
E.

Characteristicsof the Current Regime

No longer do courts simply go through the motions in apId. at 180-82.
Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
Id. at 183. The court objected to directors' actions which were aimed primarily at "protection of the noteholders (who were threatening litigation) over the
shareholders' interests." Id. at 184. Other courts have indicated that a board may
not be able to ignore noteholders' or other creditors' interests. E.g., Wieboldt v.
Schottenstein, No. 87C81 11 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 1988). Such holdings might place
directors in quite a bind if either of two constituencies with conflicting interests can
call them to account. The matter of conflicting constituencies is discussed infra
notes 321-366.
86 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183.
83
84
85
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proving defensive tactics taken by target boards in hostile takeovers. Rather, the Unocal/Revlon line of cases, as applied by the
courts, has led to a relatively active form of case-by-case review,
with generally beneficial results for target shareholders. Emphasis should be placed on three prominent features of the current
legal regime.
i. Coercive Offensive and Defensive Tactics Have Been
Minimized.
Before Unocal and Revlon, combatants in hostile takeovers
battled without much interference from the courts, resulting in
rather extreme offensive and defensive measures. Unocal's proportionality test meant that extreme offensive tactics justified extreme defensive tactics. Sharks that continued to launch
coercive, front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers saw the
courts ratify the most extreme defensive tactics available, including poison pills,87 golden parachutes, 88 and special dividends.89
Eventually, tender offerors got the message. If front-end
loaded, two-tiered offers could legally be met with the fiercest
resistance under Unocal, why not shift to all-cash, all-shares bids
that were not viewed by the courts as coercive? 90 Unocal's proportionality test would appear to prevent target boards from responding too vigorously to such an offer. Indeed, in the postUnocal era, two-tiered bids have almost disappeared. 9 '
87 Desert Partners v. USC Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1289, 1299 (N.D. 11. 1988); Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 231 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (although the
court generally approved use of the poison pill, it held that the board had not done
its homework in setting the price); Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1356
(Del. 1985).
88 Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 228-29 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
89 Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987). The
special dividend in Ivanhoe allowed a "white squire" (a friendly party which holds
shares for the target but, unlike a white knight, does not bid for control) to make a
"street sweep" (a large purchase of shares in the open market) which frustrated the
hostile tender offer.
90 All offers are arguably coercive to at least some extent. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in CorporateTakeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1723
(1985); Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisalof Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 679 (1984); Note, supra note 42, at 1966. But frontend loaded, two-tiered offers are viewed by the courts as being especially coercive.
E.g., Desert Partners v. USG Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1289, 1298-99 (N.D. Ill. 1988);
CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 93,680 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1988); Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656
F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio 1987). All-cash, all-shares bids, on the other hand, are not
typically viewed as coercive. See infra, note 92 and accompanying text.
91 In 1982, front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offers accounted for 20% of all
tender offers and were featured in most of the really large battles of 1981 and 1982.
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The surmise of the hostile offerors was largely correct.
When they made all-cash, all-shares offers, the courts presumed
such offers to be non-coercive,9 2 and generally speaking, strictly
limited the defensive tactics invoked against such offers. Thus,
poison pills, 9 3 lock-up options,9 4 and self-tenders, 9 5 among other
tactics, have been invalidated as being too severe in proportion
to the minimal threat posed by all-cash, all-shares bids. In essence, milder offenses begat milder defenses under Unocal.96
However, by 1986, only 3% of tender offers were front-end loaded, two-tiered in
nature and by 1987 the tactic had almost disappeared. Grundfest, Two-Tier Bids Are
Now a Defensive Technique, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 9, 1987, at 26, col. 4 & 27, col 1.
92 Most courts have difficulty finding anything coercive about all-shares, all-cash
offers, even if allegedly made at an inadequate price. E.g., Shamrock Holdings Inc.
v. Polaroid Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,340, at 92,223
(Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 1989) ("It is difficult to understand how, as a general matter, an
inadequate all cash, all shares tender offer, with a back end commitment at the
same price in cash, can be considered a continuing threat under Unocal."); MAI
Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,179, at 91,634 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988) (there is "nothing about"
an all-shares, all-cash bid that is coercive).
93 E.g., Grand Metro. PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988);
Southdown, Inc. v. Moore McCormack Resources, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 595, 604 (S.D.
Tex. 1988).
94 E.g., In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 10350 (Del. Ch. Dec.
30, 1988) (striking down lock-up option and termination fees used to stifle an auction and to favor a white knight over a hostile all-shares, all-cash offer).
95 E.g., AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 11415 (Del. Ch. 1986) (applying Unocal test to restrain coercive self-tender offer in face
of an all-shares, all-cash bid).
96 Indeed, much of the milder atmosphere of the case law has spilled over into
that of the commentators. Before Unocal and Revlon, the debate among commentators was focused on the polar extremes, with, for example, Martin Lipton arguing
that target boards should be given complete discretion to defeat hostile tender offers while Easterbrook and Fischel argued for total managerial passivity in the face
of such offers. E.g., Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101
(1979); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (1980); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom: An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAw. 1017 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1161 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and
Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. Lw. 1733 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, Is Takeover
Defense in Shareholders' Best Interest?, Legal Times of Wash. Aug. 10, 1981, at 42, col.
1.
A decade later, Lipton still sticks to his guns. E.g., Lipton, Corporate Governance
in the Age ofFinance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1987). And an occasional voice
will support the passivity thesis. E.g., Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer
Auction, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 229 (1986); Schwartz, Bebchuk on Minimum Offer Periods,
2 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 271 (1986). However, for most commentators the terms of the
debate have also moderated and now tend to focus on less dramatic issues, such as
who should have the burden of proof. See, e.g., Cohen, Opinion, 1 MERGERS & AcQUISITIONS L. REP. 731 (1988) (suggesting that Unocal proportionality test be supplemented by rebuttable presumption of shareholder choice); Coffee, Opinion, 1
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Shareholder Freedom of Choice Has Been Recognized
as Having Independent Value.

Numerous cases have invalidated defensive tactics, such as
poison pills or lock-up options, that block a tender offer or hinder the auction process, but nevertheless approved those same
tactics, when they were used to promote an auction or otherwise
produce alternatives for shareholders. 97 Such suits are often decided in the midst of an ongoing struggle for control and it is not
unusual for courts to decline to interfere with defensive maneuvers being used to run an auction. These same courts, however,
have threatened to enjoin those maneuvers the moment it appeared that they were stifling, rather than promoting, the bidding
process. 9 8 Once an auction reaches its "end stage," many courts
intimate that virtually no defensive tactics will be permitted to
interfere with the bidding process. 99
These cases go hand in hand with others expressly stressing
shareholder freedom of choice as a variable of independent and
increasing significance.' 0 0 This notion was expressed by the Delaware Chancery Court in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,
L. REP. 981 (1989) (suggesting that at the end-stage of a
non-coercive offer, Unocal proportionality test should be disregarded in favor of
more conclusive right of shareholders to accept offers the board deems inadequate); Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standardfor Defensive Tactics: Is
There Substance to the Proportionality Review, 44 Bus. LAW. 247 (1989) (arguing that
court should engage in "searching internal analysis of any management plan" when
target board asserts non-coercive bid is inadequate). Even in this debate, the contestants admit that their differences might simply be over matters of nomenclature.
Coffee, Opinion, 1 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS L. REP. 989 (1989).
97 E.g., Cottle v. Storer Communication, 849 F.2d 570, 576 (11 th Cir. 1988) (upheld lock-up option granted by board committed to sale at "end stage" of auction
in order to secure the arguably more favorable bid).
98 E.g., MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,179, at 91,635 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988) (refusing to
order redemption of poison pill in early stages of tender offer, but noting that redemption might be ordered later because "if the present stalemate continues indefinitely the [target's] stockholders will be denied an opportunity to make their own
investment judgment"); Doskocil Cos. v. Griggy, No. 10,095 (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 1988)
(poison pill left in place where it appeared that target board was ready to use it to
run an auction); Facet Enters. v. Prospect Group, No. 9746 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 1988)
(allowing poison pill to stay in place until the auction process has reasonably run its
course).
99 E.g., City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988) (allowing poison pill to stay in place to assist in auction, but indicating that it would
have to be removed when the auction reached its "end stage" and the pill could no
longer be helpful in inducing higher bids but could only block shareholder choice).
100 E.g., Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,965, at
90,846 (Del. Ch. July 25, 1988) (only in extreme cases may board take actions intended primarily to thwart effective exercise of shareholder choice).
MERGERS & AcQuISITIONs
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where a target board, which had agreed to redeem a poison pill
as to one bidder in a competitive auction, but not as to the other,
was ordered to redeem as to both so that shareholders would not
0
be deprived of a choice.' '
Despite this strong trend, notable exceptions have recently
occurred which have subordinated shareholder choice to directorial discretion in unusual circumstances. 0 2 However, it is unlikely that these exceptions will reverse the recent trend
emphasizing the importance of shareholder choice.
iii.

Restructurings, Leveraged Recapitalizations, and
MBO's are Increasingly Being Used as Defensive
Tactics.

Court decisions favoring auctions, shareholder freedom of
choice, and shareholder alternatives, combined with various
other factors including the easy availability of financing,1 0 3 have
led inexorably to an increase in the defensive use of restructurings, leveraged recapitalizations, and MBO's. This fact is supported by a cursory glance at the recent case law involving the
business judgment rule in the takeover context. 10 4 This article
will now briefly describe these new defensive tactics, 0 5 summarize the cases litigating their validity, focus on unanswered questions, 0 6 and then summarize and evaluate Macmillan II and its
10 7
answers to those questions.
III.

RESTRUCTURINGS, RECAPITALIZATIONS, AND
A BRIEF PRIMER

MBO's-

Cases such as Unocal and Revlon send an important message
to the boards of directors of target and potential target corpora101 Robert M. Bass Group v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988), rev'd 559
A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
102 E.g., Paramount Communication v. Time, Inc., Civ. No. 10866 (Del. Ch. July
14, 1989); Shamrock Holdings v. Polaroid Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH)
94,340 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 1989).
103 Lowenstein, Opinion, 2 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS L. REP. 427 (1989)
("[I]iberal financing made it possible" to sell $1.2 trillion worth of American industry in 1980's).
104 During 1988 and the first half of 1989, seldom did a week go by when a major
takeover was not being litigated in some court, usually the Court of Chancery in
Delaware. See Meyers, Showdown in Delaware: The Battle to Shape Takeover Law, INST.
INVESTOR,

Feb. 1989, at 97.

105 See infra notes 108 to 139 and accompanying text.
106

See infra notes 140 to 221 and accompanying text.

107 See infra notes 222 to 368 and accompanying text.
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tions. In essence, courts view tender offers as beneficial for target shareholders because they give target shareholders an
opportunity to sell their shares at a profit. Target boards should,
therefore, think primarily in terms of offering alternatives to their
shareholders rather than blocking hostile bids altogether. Those
alternatives might come in the form of an auction between the
shark and white knights recruited by target management, or uninvited "gray knights" might join in.
Increasingly, however, those alternatives are provided directly by the target itself in the form of restructurings, recapitalizations, and MBO's. Sometimes these alternatives are directly
responsive to a hostile bid. At other times they are used proactively to preempt the making of hostile bids. In either event, it is
important to understand how these restructurings are effected
and their impact.
The broad concept of a "restructuring" encompasses any of
a number of changes in corporate strategy and redeployment of
corporate assets. A restructuring can take the form of a recapitalization, the sale of attractive assets, the divesting by spin-off or
otherwise of non-core operations, creation of master limited
partnerships (MLP's) to hold key assets, and even the most extreme option, the MBO.' 0 8
A.

Recapitalizations

Recapitalizations constitute a very important subcategory of
corporate restructurings. A "leveraged recapitalization" involves
a corporation replacing a large portion of its equity with debt by
exchanging cash, securities, or a combination of both for the
shares held in public hands. While the public shareholders retain
roughly their proportionate interest in the company after the recapitalization, they hold "stub shares" representing a smaller
share base in a more highly leveraged company. 0 9 Management
and employee stock option plans, on the other hand, generally
forgo the cash payment, trading their shares solely for stock in
the company, thus substantially increasing their aggregate percentage equity interest in the recapitalized company." 0
108 See Block & Hoff, Recapitalizationsand Restructurings, N.Y.L.J., May 14, 1987, at
5, col. 1.
109 See generally Teeters, The Leveraged Recap: Controversial New Defense Maneuver, J.
Bus. STRATEGY, Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 26 (discussing risks of the new recap); Willens,
Recap of Leveraged Recaps, Barron's Weekly, July 6, 1987 at 36, col. 1 (discussing the
leveraged recap as a popular new anti-takeover defense).
110 See Foye, Defensive Recapitalization: A New Value Alternative, in STRUCTURING
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Despite many potential drawbacks,"'. as defensive measures,
recapitalizations provide a multitude of advantageous features.
The fact that a recapitalized company is highly leveraged greatly
reduces the opportunity for a hostile bidder to rely on the assets
of the target for financing. Further, a large portion of future cash
flows are committed to debt holders rather than equity holders,"1 2 which in turn discourages hostile bidders. In the case of a
large dividend, the shareholders' desire for cash may in large
part be appeased while at the same time cash reserves which
might attract an unwanted suitor are reduced. 1 3 Another feature increasing the defensive aspect of recapitalizations, and
hence their popularity, is the fact that to the extent management
has increased its percentage ownership in the company, a takeover will be rendered that much more difficult.
Some commentators feel that the recent surge in leveraged
recapitalizations is largely demand driven. 14 This characterizaLEVERAGED BUYOUTS: DEFENSIVE RECAPITALIZATION AND OTHER DEFENSIVE TECHNIQUES 198 (1988); Fogg, Leveraged Recaps: Maximizing Shareholder Value, Nat'l L.J.,

Feb. 8, 1988, at 24, col. 1 ("Typically, [recaps] substantially increase the equity
participation in the corporation of management and other employees.").
I II Prior to the consummation of a recapitalization, the directors must ensure
that the transaction does not run afoul of the law of fraudulent conveyances. Delaware corporation law and the law of most states imposes several financial tests upon
the distribution of assets to shareholders, whether through means of a dividend or
a share purchase. Primarily, no dividend or share repurchase may be completed if
the effect of such payment is to leave the corporation unable to meet its obligations
as they come due. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1983); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT (RMBCA) § 6.40(c)(1)
(1985). Additionally, no shares may be
purchased or redeemed by the corporation when the capital of the corporation is
impaired or would become impaired as a result of the transaction. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 160 (1983). RMBCA § 6.40(c)(2). Under Delaware law, capital impairment
exists when liabilities exceed the value of the corporation's assets. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 154 (1983). RMBCA § 6.40(c)(2).
The fraudulent conveyance problem is usually circumvented by having the
board "write up" the assets to their fair market value, thus creating sufficient surplus to avoid the impairment of capital. Such a practice has been approved in Delaware. Morris v. Standard Gas & Elec., 31 Del. Ch. 20, 63 A.2d 577, 583 (1949). If a
particular state's law does not allow the board to create "revaluation surplus," it
may be necessary to include a reincorporation merger in the recap plan and to
obtain shareholder approval. Fogg, supra note 110, at 24, col. 2.
112 Block, Levine & Berger, Corporate Recapitalization: Structuring the Transaction, in
RESTRUCTURING THE CORPORATION: RECAPITALIZATION AND OTHER TAKEOVER DEFENSES 38 (1987).

113 Id.

DeMott, Directors' Duties in Management Buyouts and Leveraged Recapitalization, 49
L.J. 517 (1988).
There is also evidence that many of these deals are tax-driven. Bartlett, Corporate Reorganizations, Leveraged ESOPs, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 30. col. 1 ("Corporate reorganizations of all types are generally tax driven.").
114
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tion advances the view that the market forces which make recapitalizations more attractive also determine the demand for the
assets produced as a result of these transactions. Among these
market forces are the emphasis on short-term value in the marketplace, the high prices at which the stub shares have been
trading, ' 1 5 and the continued availability of debt and equity
financing.
Recapitalizations had also been considered popular due
largely to the fact that they were not viewed as a "sale" or change
of control that would give rise to the Revlon auction duty." 6
However, recent court decisions indicating that this is no longer
the case' may affect recapitalization practices. Recapitalizations
can be implemented in several ways.
115 Foye, supra note 110, at 199.

Several of the major recaps implemented to date have seen the market place
substantial value on the post-recap stub stock. For example, the Multimedia stub
equity was valued at $8.37 on May 2, 1985, the date the recap was announced. As
of May 28, 1987, Multimedia shares were selling at $52.40 (a 535% increase, impressive when compared with a 62% increase in the S&P 500 for the same period).
Cowan, The New Way to Halt Raiders, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1987, at D1, col. 2. Likewise, in the FMC recap, the stub shares were trading at $19.25 on May 29, 1986,
the first day after the recap was effected. As of June 1, 1987, FMC shares were
selling at $34.75, giving the entire recap package a value of $114.75 per share. On
August 31, 1987, the price reached $45.18, bringing the total value to $125.13. See
The FMC Recapitalization, infra note 121, at 51.
The price of these high returns is increased volatility. While a Drexel Burnham
Lambert study showed that 38 restructured stocks outperformed the S&P 500 by a
wide margin between August 1983 and August 1987, in the heart of the bull market, shares associated with Drexel Burnham Lambert (the most active underwriter
of highly leveraged transactions) fell 50% between August 28, 1987 and October
28, 1987, when the S&P 500 fell by only 30% in the same period. Smith, Performance of High-Debt Firms After Crash Bears Out Warnings of Volatility in Downturn, Wall St.
J., Nov. 3, 1987, at 71, col. 3.
116 Cases which indicated that a recap might not trigger the Revlon auction duty
included Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) and
Gelco v. Coniston Partners, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987).
Several commentators have traced the popularity of recaps to this perception.
Gilson, Macmillan: Was It Worth the Wait, 2 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONs L. REP. 623,
625; Cowan, The lVew lVay to Halt Raiders, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1987, at Dl, col. 2 &
D4 col. 4.
117 The case which is the focus of this article, Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan
("Macmillan II"), 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988), implies, but does not explicitly hold,
that recaps transferring control give rise to the Revlon auction duty. See discussion
infra notes 287 to 312 and accompanying text. However, even before Macmillan II
there were cases which indicated that the mere fact that a defensive transaction was
structured as a recap would not necessarily allow evasion of the Revlon auction duty.
E.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772, 781-82
(D. Del. 1988).
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i.

Recap as Merger.

In a recapitalization structured as a merger, a shell corporation is merged into the company, with the company as the surviving corporation. In the merger, each share of the company's
stock is converted into cash, or cash and debt plus a new share
and each share of the shell corporation's stock is converted into
new shares. The shell corporation's stock is received by management immediately prior to the merger in exchange for their
shares of the company's stock." l8 Under Delaware law, shareholder approval is required and those opposing the merger are
entitled to appraisal rights.' "9
ii.

Recap as Reclassification.

A reclassification requires an amendment to the corporation's certificate of incorporation, reclassifying existing shares
into new shares and authorizing issuance of a new class of preferred shares that immediately converts into cash, or cash and
debt. 2 ° Immediately prior to the transaction, management typically exchanges its shares for shares of another series of preferred stock, which is in turn reclassified and converted solely
into new shares'

l2

'

Because a shareholder vote is required in both the merger
and reclassification form of recapitalization, a company's flexibility may be limited by time constraints. This takes on particular
significance when a recapitalization is implemented in response
118 Lederman & Goroff, Recapitalization Transactions, 19 SEC. & COMMODITIES REG.
241 (1986).
A leading example is the 1986 Owens-Corning recapitalization which was
structured as a merger in which OCF paid "$52 in cash and one $35 principal
amount junior subordinated debenture and one new common share for each outstanding common share." Certain employee benefit plans received equivalent
value in the form of 5.6 new common shares for each old share. See The OwensCorning Recap, 22 MERGERS & AcQuisITIONs L. REP. 51 (1987).
119 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251 (1983). Delaware law requires a majority vote for
approval of such a merger. See aLso RMBCA § § 11.03 and 13.02 (requiring a majority vote and allowing appraisal rights for dissenters).
120 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 242(a)(3) (1983). Delaware law requires a majority
vote by the shareholders to amend the articles of incorporation. See also RMBCA
§§ 10.03 and 10.04 (requiring majority vote).
121 A leading example of this type of recapitalization occurred when FMC Corp.
used the reclassification structure in its 1986 recap. In the reclassification, public
shareholders received 1/100th of a share of a new series of preferred stock, which
immediately after issuance was redeemed for $80 in cash and one share of new
common stock for each share of old common stock. Employee stock option funds
and management received 5.667 new shares in exchange for each old share. See The
FMC Recapitalization, MERGERS & AcQUISITIONs L. REP. 51 (1987).
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to a takeover bid by an unwanted suitor. For this reason, companies often submit shareholder rights' plans or other charter
amendments for shareholder approval in a single, unified proposal along with the recapitalization plan. Adoption of these
"anchors" has been justified as providing a corporation with sufficient time to realize the anticipated value to be achieved by the
22
recapitalization.
iii.

Recap as Dividend.

In a recapitalization structured as a dividend, shareholders
receive a special cash dividend substantial in amount relative to
the current trading price of the company's common stock. Management and ESOP's however, generally receive additional
shares through a combination of new stock plans and a reinvestment of the cash dividend they receive.12 3 From a tactical standpoint, dividends do not require shareholder approval and
1 24
accordingly do not give rise to appraisal rights.
iv.

Recap as Share Repurchase or Self-Tender.

Large open market share repurchases or self-tender offers
provide additional means of recapitalizing a company. These
methods involve a company's offer to purchase a substantial
number of its own shares for cash, or a combination of cash, debt
25
securities and preferred stock.'
Share repurchases are often accompanied by the simultaneous creation of an ESOP, to which the company issues shares.
Typically, the company borrows funds which are reloaned to the
newly-created ESOP on substantially similar terms. The funds
See Block & Hoff, supra note 108, at 5, col. 2.
See Foye, supra note 110, at 201.
A prime example of a recap in the form of a special dividend is that effected
by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich (HBR). In the face of a $44 per share merger proposal from British Printing & Communication Corp., HBJ approved a dividend of cash
and preferred stock with a combined value of $50 per HBJ share. HBJ also
purchased a significant amount of its common stock in the open market after the
announcement of its dividend. See British Printing & Communication v. Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1519, 1525 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (upholding the
recap, because an independent board did its homework and an auction was not
entirely foreclosed, even though one bidder was favored).
125 Examples of this form of recapitalization abound. As noted in the previous
footnote, the HBJ recap involves repurchase of a substantial number of shares in
the open market. A self-tender offer was attempted and invalidated in AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 109-10 (Del. Ch. 1986).
Anderson Clayton might have fared better had its self-tender not been a front-end
loaded, two-tiered scheme to defeat a non-coercive hostile offer. Id. at 113.
122
123
124
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are subsequently returned to the company as payment for the
stock issued to the ESOP. The ESOP then repays the loan out of
the company's future tax-deductible contributions to the
ESOP. 2 6 In addition to the advantage of placing a greater percentage of shares in friendly hands, creation of ESOP's also allows institutional investors making ESOP loans to companies to
exclude one-half of the interest on the loan from gross income.
This tax benefit is generally shared with the company through
27
lower interest rates.
v.

Sale of Attractive Assets.

Another form of restructuring is the sale of those assets most
attractive to a potential or actual suitor, 2 8 the "crown jewels."
This defensive approach has a long history 2 9 and has recently
become even more popular as the general concept of restructuring and the more specific notion of "deconglomeration" have
come into vogue.1 30
126 See Rosen, The Growing Appeal of the Leveraged ESOP, 10 J. Bus.
(Jan./Feb. 1989).

STRATEGY

16, 17

127 Id. at 144-45.

For a detailed overview of the tax treatment of recaps and restructurings in
general, see I FREEMAN, Tax Strategiesfor Leveraged Buyouts and Other CorporateAcquisitions, Restructurings and Financings, 7 (1988). Regarding the specific tax advantages
of restructuring through an ESOP, see 2 LUDWIG, New Techniques, Special Features, and
Enhanced Incentives in Utilizing ESOPs, 491 (addressing general tax advantages of ESOPs), and 2 Serota, New Techniques, Special Features, and Enhanced Incentives in Utilizing
ESOPs, at 467 (addressing sale of divisions).
Note, however, that Congress is considering reducing some of the tax advantages that ESOP's have enjoyed. See Birnbaum & Winker, Rostenkowski Acts to Repeal
Tax Break From ESOPs'Saleof Bonds to Buy Stock, Wall St. J., June 8, 1989, at B5, col. 5
(S.W. ed.).
128 See supra note 28.
129 Among the leading early instances of sale of a crown jewel was Brunswick's
sale of its Sherwood Medical subsidiary to American Home Products, which caused
Whittaker Corporation to abandon its hostile offer for Brunswick. W4hittaker Abandons Battle for Brunswick as Court Clears Sale of Sherwood M'edical, Wall St. J., Mar. 9,
1982, at 5, col. 1 (S.W. ed.). That defensive maneuver was challenged in court.
However, under the pre-1985 version of the business judgment rule it was, of
course, upheld. Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. 11. 1982).
Also famous is Marathon Oil Company's granting of a lockup option to
purchase its crown jewel (an interest in the Yates oil field) to white knight U.S. Steel
to allow it to defeat hostile offeror Mobil Corporation. O'Boyle & Rotbart, Marathon Oil Holders Vote Its Acquisition by U.S. Steel, Which Plans to Keep All of It, Wall St.J.,
Mar. 12, 1982, at 3, col. 2 (S.W. ed.). The granting of these lock-up options was
later declared invalid by the Sixth Circuit, albeit under an erroneous interpretation
of federal law. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
130 See Arieff, Firms Reverse Field, Start Selling Subsidiaries, Legal Times, Oct. 31,
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Corporate Spin-Offs.

One method of increasing market value for shareholders by
calling the stock market's attention to the value of underlying assets is the spin-off. This usually entails placing some valuable
assets in a newly-formed corporation and selling some of the
shares in an initial public offering. 13 1 The spin-off is usually motivated by the same general factors that give rise to sale of crown
13 2
jewels, and often carries tax benefits.
vii.

Master Limited Partnerships.

Natural resource industries have restructured through the
creation of master limited partnerships (MLP's) into which are
placed undervalued corporate assets so that the cash flow they
generate may be more visible to the market and more directly
34
realizable by shareholders. 13 3 Again, tax benefits are involved, 1
but the thrust is often to channel value to shareholders and away
from potential appropriation by a hostile offeror.
B.

Management Buyouts

MBO's are perhaps the most extreme form of defensive restructuring-one in which the target's management buys all of
the stock from non-management shareholders in a highly leveraged transaction. 15 In situations where the Revlon rule appears
1983, at 2, col. 1 ("a new trend . . . [is]

'asset redeployment' or 'disaggrega-

tion' ").

For example, as part of its major restructuring in 1987, Colt Indus., sold five
different subsidiaries for $56 million as part of a plan to raise shareholder value and
strengthen takeover defenses. See Profile of a Coporate Restructuring: Colt Indus., Corporate Restructuring, Mar. 1988, at 9. Another example occurred when Liggett
Group, attempting unsuccessfully to fend off a bid by Grand Metropolitan that was
thought to be motivated in large part by a desire to acquire Liggett's Austin Nichols
subsidiary, sold that subsidiary to Pernod Ricard S.A. See Lederman, Restructuring
As a Takeover Defense, in 19TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 197-98
(1987).
131 A leading example of the spin-off technique was Pillsbury's attempt to spin off
its Burger King subsidiary as part of its restructuring plan to defeat a bid by Grand
Met. Unfortunately for Pillsbury, the spin-off was enjoined by the court. Grand
Metrop. PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
132 Lederman, supra note 130, at 199.
133 Id. at 198.
134 Id. at 199. Among the corporations that have used the MLP technique are
Diamond Shamrock, International Paper, Unocal, and T. Boone Pickens' Mesa Petroleum. Id. Some MLPs have had problems, see, e.g., Maita, The Bloom is Off MLP
Market, S.F. Chronicle, July 27, 1987, at 23, col. 2.
135 Oesterle & Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating Shareholder
Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 207, 210 (1988); Williams, ProceduralSafeguards to Ensure
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to mandate sale of the company, target managements often question why they should not be the purchasers. After all, modern
junk bond financing provides an abundant source of funds and
requires very little financial commitment by the managers
personally. 3 6
In the typical MBO, management forms a holding corporation (Newco) which proposes a merger with the publicly-held target corporation. In accordance with the merger agreement,
Newco survives and then acquires the business and assets of the
target. The public shareholders of the latter receive cash and/or
securities for their shares. The transaction is usually financed by
borrowing heavily against the cash flow and assets of the target.
Thus, MBO's are correctly viewed as simply a form of a leveraged
buyout (LBO). 3' 7
MBO's have been heavily criticized on several grounds' 3 8
and their use raises numerous questions that are beyond the
Fairness in the Management Buyout: A Proposal, 21 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 191'

(1988).
136 Bruner & Paine, Management Buyouts and ManagerialEthics, 30 CAL. MGMT. REV.

89, 90-91 (1988).
137 See generally Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE
L.J. 1354 (1978) (discussing freezeouts that involve public stockholders who have
no active role in managing the corporation and a small percentage interest in the
company).
It is important to distinguish MBO's from the broader category of freeze-out
or cash-out mergers. In a freeze-out merger, the purchaser already owns a majority
interest in the target and acts to eliminate the public shareholders through a
merger by forcing them to trade their shares for cash. A management which does
not already own a majority interest may acquire it through a tender offer (by
"Newco" which management controls) or by a redemption by the target of its own
shares, thus increasing management's ownership to a majority percentage level.
Such a transaction is known as a "two-step" transaction. See Repetti, Management
Buyouts, Efficient Markets, Fair Value, and Soft Information, 67 N.C.L. REV. 120 (1988).
138 The controversy surrounding MBO's centers on the fact that management
places itself in the precarious position of being both the buyer and the seller of the
corporation, creating a conflict of interest which potentially jeopardizes its duty of
undivided loyalty. See Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 739
(1985); Stein, A New Low? Barron's Weekly, Nov. 14, 1988, at 17; Longstreth, Fairness of Management Buyouts Needs Evaluation, Legal Times, Oct. 10, 1983, at 15, col. 1.
This conflict is most disturbing when shareholders sell to their managers a faltering
firm marked by historically low share prices, only to watch the same management
team turn the firm around and sell it for a handsome profit only a few years later.
See Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 135, at 241; Beatrice Buyout May Net Investors
Eightfold Return, Wall St. J., June 18, 1987, at 4, col. 1.
There is also fear that management is taking unfair advantage of the shareholders by utilizing nonpublic information, and worse, that management will use such
inside information and its position to manipulate share prices so that it can get a
bargain. See Lowenstein, supra note 138, at 740 (listing examples). But see Booth,
Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare, and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L.
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scope of this article.' 39 For the purpose of this article it is noteworthy that target managers, faced with hostile bids and constrained by the Unocal and Revlon rules, will likely continue to find
the MBO an attractive method of offering an alternative avenue
for shareholder choice.
IV.

RESTRUCTURINGS, RECAPS,

MBO's,

AND THE BUSINESS

JUDGMENT RULE

In the last two years or so, the post-Unocal/Revlon litigation
regarding the business judgment rule in the hostile takeover environment has focused increasingly on restructurings, recaps and
MBO's. As noted earlier, these devices have been used repeatedly and litigation about their validity has escalated. A chronological summary of the main cases decided since Unocal and
Revlon provides background helpful to an ultimate discussion of
the key unresolved issues.
The Southern District of New York, in GAF Corp. v. Union
Carbide Corp., 140 upheld a defensive recapitalization in the form of
an exchange offer of $20 in cash and debentures that restricted
the sale in any one year of more than 25% of the company's net
assets and, in certain circumstances, limited such sales to 5% per
year. The court, without citing Unocal, echoed its view that a target board can attempt to protect constituencies other than shareholders-in this case, protecting them from the "bust-up"
takeover that GAF was planning. 1 ' The court viewed the GAF
plan as unfair, commenting that "[s]elf-appointed potential acquirers of control are not a protected species in corporate law...
entitled to have Boards of Directors smooth [their] path to
control." 142
REV. 630, 638 (1980) (rejecting the view that MBO's necessarily involve misuse of
inside information).
139 For example, like standard recapitalizations, MBO's raise fraudulent conveyance problems. See generally Smyser, Going Privateand Going Under: Leveraged Buyouts
and the Fraudulent Conveyance Problem, 63 IND. L.J. 781 (1988) (arguing that MBO's
create a fraudulent conveyance problem); Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance
Law and Its ProperDomain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1985) (arguing that MBO's should

be excluded from fraudulent conveyance law).
140 624 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying New York law).
141 Id. at 1019. A GAF official admitted that GAF intended to sell $4 billion in
Union Carbide assets in order to finance the purchase. Thus, the possibility of
substantial dislocation for employee/shareholders was clear. Id. GAF is one of the
leading cases suggesting that non-shareholder constituencies may properly be considered by the board of directors in deciding whether or not to oppose a tender
offer.

142 Id. at 1020.

While other courts have intimated that sharks deserve to be
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In Edelman v. FruehaufCorp.,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals enjoined a target board's rubberstamping of an MBO made
in response to a hostile tender offer. The court reasoned that the
board prevented the hostile bidder from raising its bid in response to the MBO and provided $100 million of corporate
funds to finance the MBO, funds that were not available to the
44
hostile offeror, well-known shark, Asher Edelman.1
AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co. 145 involved a selftender offer and sale of shares to an ESOP which defendant management proposed in response to a $56 per share all-cash, allshares offer by plaintiff. 4 6 The self-tender was a front-end
loaded, two-tiered offer that would pay shareholders $60 per
share for 65% of the company's shares and leave them holding
shares trading at $22-$31 or $37-$52, depending on which investment banker was believed. Applying the Unocal test, the
court viewed the self-tender offer as satisfying the first prong regarding a threat to corporate effectiveness or policy. Although
plaintiff's offer might have been preferable, the court noted that
the self-tender did involve a large, tax-advantaged cash distribution to shareholders who would continue to participate in the
new, highly-leveraged company. 147 However, the court determined that the self-tender offer not to be reasonable in relation
to the threat posed in that its coercive two-tiered nature virtually
precluded the shareholders from considering any alternatives. 4 8
Because the defense failed the second prong of the Unocal test,
the court held that the action did not qualify for protection under
the business judgment rule, deeming it a breach of the duty of
treated fairly by a target board, especially when an auction is undertaken, e.g.,
Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., 663 F. Supp. 614, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
GAF appears to disagree.
143 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying Michigan law).
144 Id. at 885-87. Although Michigan law controlled, the court quoted Revlon regarding the auction duty and commended the trial court for setting a framework to
open the bidding process. Id. at 887.
145 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
146 Id. at 104. The self-tender offer was Anderson Clayton's second response to
the hostile offer. Id. at 106. The first, a recapitalization, had been enjoined by a
court not long before. Id.
147 Id. at 112. Obviously it could be argued that the self-tender with its "stub"
equity for shareholders was the preferable choice, because it allowed shareholders
some immediate benefit and also promised them the opportunity to participate in
the long-term prosperity, if any, of the company. The value of such "stub" shares
is the focus of much of the debate on the right of directors to "just say no" and to
run an auction that favors a recapitalization plan over a hostile offer that provides
more immediate value.
148 Id. at 113.
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loyalty even if motivated in good faith. The judge further commented that the duty would be satisfied only by a showing that
49
the offer was "objectively or intrinsically fair."
Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners150 involved a managementsponsored exchange offer that would have placed 53% of the
voting power in the hands of target management and its investment advisor, Merrill Lynch. The plan was developed before a
competing hostile bid by Coniston, but launched afterward.
Coniston subsequently sought to enjoin the restructuring plan.
Applying the Unocal test, the trial judge determined that the
board, composed of a majority of outside independent directors,
satisfied the test's first prong by demonstrating good faith and
reasonable investigation. Next, the court viewed the response as
reasonable in light of evidence that the hostile offer was inadequate and that the offeror, Coniston, had a reputation as a raider
bent on liquidation. Furthermore, the court found that no auction duty arose from either the fact that the hostile bid was an allcash, all-shares bid' 5 ' or from the arguable shift of control to
management and its "ally" Merrill Lynch, given that the Merrill
Lynch shares were redeemable and that Merrill Lynch was not
bound to vote them in any particular way. The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, reaching only a few of the

issues. 152
The Southern District of New York, in British Printing & Communications Corp. v. Harcourt BraceJovanovich, Inc.,"' upheld a recapitalization' 5 4 finding that an independent board had done its
homework and the recap did not foreclose an acquisition entirely. The recapitalization was allowed even though the board
149 Id. at 115. This "intrinsically fair" language is perilously close to the "entire
fairness" test, which has generally been reserved for situations where management
has a rather patent financial conflict of interest. A self-tender offer, standing alone,
should not be sufficient to invoke the entire fairness test. unless it transfers control
to management or, as here, is coercive (front-end loaded, two-tiered).
150 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying Minnesota law).
151 Id. at 847. Although the court applied Minnesota law, like most other jurisdictions, it drew heavily from Delaware law. This was one of the first cases to explicitly struggle with the question of what circumstances are required to trigger the
Revlon auction duty.
152 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987). The circuit court's opinion dealt mainly with
the propriety of injunctive relief given the unlikelihood of irreparable injury.
153 664 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying New York law).
154 See supra note 124 for details of the recapitalization. The recapitalization by
HBJ served as the model for the recapitalization used by the Macmillan company
and addressed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan,
Inc. (Macmillan 11), 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
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showed favoritism to investment bankers who participated in the
transactions and profited rather handsomely. The court noted
that the board believed that the hostile bidder, whose proposed
merger prompted the recap, had made an offer that was inadequate and not entirely serious. Though the recap discouraged
this particular bidder, the court did not view it as a bar to a bid15 5
der with sufficient capital and determination.
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,56 like Unocal, arose
out of a battle initiated by a T. Boone Pickens' two-tiered offer.
Given that such an offer is considered a serious threat to corporate policy and effectiveness under the first prong of the Unocal
test,' 57 the Delaware Supreme Court upheld Ivanhoe's response,
a restructuring which involved a large dividend to existing shareholders given for the purpose of reducing liquidity and facilitating a "street sweep" 5 8 by target Newmont's largest shareholder,
Gold Fields. The court held the Revlon duty to auction inapplicable because sale of Newmont was not "inevitable," although after
the street sweep, Gold Fields held 49% of Newmont shares. A
"stand still" agreement, 59 the court noted, limited Gold Fields
to that 49% ownership and to a 40% position on the board of
60
directors. 1
In The Henley Group v. Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corp.,61 the
court upheld the decision of Santa Fe's board to remain independent and to pursue a restructuring in the face of a takeover
155 British Printing & Communications Corp., 664 F. Supp. at 1529.
156

535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987), aff 'g 533 A.2d 585 (Del. Ch. 1987).

157 Id. at 1342. Following its earlier decisions in Moran and Unocal, the Delaware

Supreme Court further emphasized the distinction between the "coercive" frontend loaded, two-tiered tender offers and the non-threatening all-cash, all-shares
offers. This helped resolve one set of issues, but raised another, can a board ever
oppose an all-cash, all-shares bid as coercive simply on grounds that the price offered was inadequate? Ivanhoe, however, did not address this issue.
158 As noted earlier, a "street sweep," also called a "market sweep," is a large
purchase of shares on the open market that occurs while a tender offer is pending
or immediately after one has been terminated. See id. at 1337 n.3. The SEC is not
pleased with the street sweep tactic, believing that it allows acquirors undue latitude to skirt the provisions of the Williams Act and thereby disadvantages small
investors. See Blanc, Commission Proposes to Outlaw Market Sweeps, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 9,
1987, at 28, col. 1.
159 A "standstill" agreement binds a potential bidder not to pursue aggressive
takeover measures, such as a tender offer or proxy fight. See generally Bartlett &
Andrews, The Standstill Agreement: Legal and Business Considerations Underlying a Corporate Peace Treaty, 62 B.U.L. REV. 143 (1982) (examining standstill agreements,
describing potential legal problems, and offering suggestions for contract drafters).
160 Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1344-45.
161 Civ. Action No. 9569, 1988 W.L. 23945 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 1988).
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bid by a major shareholder, The Henley Group. The board protected the restructuring plan with a poison pill. Both tactics were
sustained by the court as reasonable because Henley's Schedule
13D filing had implicitly threatened a two-tiered offer.' 6 2 Because the board was offering an economic alternative to the
shareholders, the court noted that it was entitled to protect that
alternative with the poison pill, even though some of its actions
impeded a fair proxy context. 161
Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard,Inc. 164 culminated in
a federal district judge issuing an order enjoining target American Standard's recapitalization plan which, with a coordinated offering of shares to an ESOP, would have increased management
control from a relatively small position to 55%. The recap also
had the affect of making $230 million of target funds available to
finance the recap that was not available to the hostile offeror.
The court held that the Revlon duty to auction arose not only
from the inevitable sale of all shares of a target, but also from a
change of control, as happened here. 16 5 The duty to auction was
breached, according to the court, by several actions of target
management which favored the recap over Black & Decker's hostile offer, even
though the recap was not the clearly superior
66
1
alternative.
The Southern District of Texas in Southdown, Inc. v. Moore
McCormack Resources, 167 invalidated a poison pill and a restructuring plan holding that the target board had violated its Revlon auction duty when it used the pill to prevent the shareholders from
choosing between the restructuring and a non-coercive, all-cash,
68
all-shares offer. 1
162 Id. at 30 (slip op.). Thus, even the threat of a two-tiered offer can justify extreme defensive measures.
163 Id. Again, it must be stressed that the cases summarized here involve recaps,
MBO's and the like, which provide alternatives to target shareholders. Whether
Henley, for example, would have reached the same result if target management had
simply said "no" without offering an alternative is unresolved.
164 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988).
165 Id. at 781-82. This holding seemingly clashed with the Delaware Supreme
Court's Ivanhoe ruling, where no auction duty was found despite a transaction leading a white squire to hold 49% of the target's shares. It thus highlighted one of the
key issues to be addressed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Macmillan II.
166 Id. at 784. Among other advantages, the recapitalization plan made $130 million of corporate funds available to fund the recap that was not available to hostile
bidder Black & Decker. Id. at 786.
167 686 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (applying Delaware law).
168 Id. at 604. Although the court did not cite Unocal, it clearly believed that the
defensive maneuvers were out of proportion to the threat posed by a "simple, uniform, straight-forward, and nondiscriminatory" bid by Southdown. Id.
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Robert M. Bass Group v. Evans (Macmillan I)169 a precursor to
Macmillan H, which will receive substantial attention in the next
section of this article, evaluated management's defensive plan to
split the company, Macmillan, Inc., into two separate corporations, with management owning 39% of one of them. The Delaware Chancery Court held that this transaction was not
proportional to the minimal threat posed by an all-cash, allshares bid, especially because the board already had in place a
multitude of defensive measures including a poison pill, golden
parachutes, and shark repellent amendments. 7 ' Additionally,
the court viewed the restructuring as a "sale" to management
which arguably triggered the Revlon auction duty. 17 ' The court
held that the board's claim that its restructuring carried the benefit of allowing public shareholders to continue to enjoy the benefits of the company through their "stub" shares did not justify
precluding them from choosing between the two offers, especially where the Bass Group's bid was, quite arguably, economi72
cally superior. 1
In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litigation '7' approved an
MBO, even though the target board showed some favoritism to
the management group over competing bidders. The court held
that Revlon's auction duty did not require board passivity or total
neutrality if lock-ups and topping fees 1 7 4 would advance the auction.'7 5 Though there were "suspicious" circumstances, the
court concluded that the board had acted in good faith.' 7 6
169 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988). For clarification, it must be emphasized that
Macmillan I arose out of the same battle for control for the Macmillan Company that
later led to the decisions that are the main focus of this article. See infra notes 223234.
170 Macmillan 1, 552 A.2d at 1245.
171 Id. at 1243, 1246. Thus, Macmillan I followed Black & Decker in implying that
the Revlon auction duty is triggered by transfer of effective control of the company,
and not only when the sale of the target is "inevitable."
172 Id. at 1246-47. The court also noted that the recapitalization plan would
make Macmillan virtually "takeover proof" and that management would profit
handsomely from the restructuring. Id.
The court's overruling management's position regarding the value of the
"stub" share would appear to mitigate against a right for target management to
"just say no." On the other hand, this was not a case where target management was
simply trying to defeat a hostile bid; rather, it involved two competing bids, one
hostile and one a recap sponsored by management.
173 Civ. Action No. 9991, 1988 W.L. 83147 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988).
174 A "topping fee" is an expense provision that typically requires the target to
pay to the grantee a fee equal to the amount by which a competing bidder "tops"
the bid made by the grantee.
175 In re Fort Howard Corp., Civ. Action No. 9991, at 35 (slip op.).
176 Id. at 30, 34. The court overcame its suspicions, in part, because the board
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In re Amsted Industries, Inc. Litigation,1 77 similar to Fort Howard,
upheld a settlement in a class action suit brought to challenge an
MBO sponsored by a senior management group and an ESOP.
Although the company was not "shopped," the court nonetheless approved the transaction because objecting shareholders did
not demonstrate that the board's special committee of outside
directors, who consented to the deal, was grossly negligent or
acted in bad faith. Although the plaintiffs' claim was litigable,
under the proposed settlement the bid was raised by $.75 per
share. The court deemed this to be a fair settlement price for the
litigation, particularly since it was approved by the special com1 78
mittee and the company's largest shareholder.
Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp. 171 turned on the
court's conclusion that an investment banker's opinion provided
solid evidence that a hostile tender offer price was inadequate.
The court, therefore, refused to enjoin target management's
adoption of (and refusal to redeem) a poison pill, its planned restructuring in the form of a spin-off, 180 and its planned search for
bida white squire. 18 ' The court was not swayed by the hostile
1 82
der's argument that its all-cash offer was non-coercive.
In re KDI Shareholders Litigation 183 involved a shareholder
challenge to an MBO which was rejected on the ground that,
although there were some suspicious circumstances, the board
had conducted a fair auction. Because the board had tried diligently but unsuccessfully to produce other offers, even good-bye
fees and expenses for the MBO group were approved by the
84
court. 1
Similar to Nomad, the court in City Capital Associated v. Interco
Inc. 185 held that a board is justified in acting against an all-share,
acted through an independent "Special Committee" that made substantial (though
not perfect) efforts to shop the company. Id. at 32-33.
177 Civ. Action No. 8224 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 1988).
178 Id. at 21-22, 27-28 (slip op.). Both this case and Fort Howard illustrate that a
court is less likely to overturn a board's actions when the case is at the settlement
stage, rather than just beginning.
179 [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,040 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 16, 1988) (also titled In re Damon Corp. Stockholders Litig.).
180 This was an unusual proposal for a spin-off of shares of a subsidiary directly
to shareholders. Id. at 90,869.
181 Id. at 90,873.
182 Id. at 90,874. Thus, this opinion gave less weight to the shareholders' right to
choose, and more discretion to the board of directors, than many others.
183 Civ. Action No. 10,278 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 1988).
184 Id.
185 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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all-cash offer if it is inadequate. The action approved, it must be
noted, was the arranging of a new alternative for the shareholders, not a simple rejection of the hostile bid.'8 6 The court noted
that an inadequate offer can be a threat to corporate policy and
effectiveness. In this case, however, the target's restructuring alternative was allegedly worth only 3% more than the hostile bid.
Therefore, the court determined that the threat was very mild
and the target's poison pill was too severe in relation to that
threat.187 Because the restructuring could be considered the
more desirable alternative, however, the court approved this as a
reasonable response. 8 8 In addition, the court held that the Revlon auction duty did not always require the selling of the company
but that it may instead simply require the obtaining of information about the value of various alternatives. If the restructuring
is a more beneficial alternative, reasoned the court, then no auction is required.' 8 9
186 Id. at 797-98. The court distinguished between threats to voluntariness and
threats from "inadequate" but noncoercive offers. A coercive bid that threatens
the shareholders may be defended by a wide variety of measures. The classic example given by the court, naturally, was the front-end loaded, two-tiered offer. Id. at
797.
However, the court viewed a threat from an "inadequate" but noncoercive offer differently. Id. This brought up the "just say no" issue. The court stated that
"it would not be surprising or unreasonable to claim that where an offer is not

coercive or deceptive . . .a board . . . is not authorized to take preclusive action"

even if it believes the bid to be inadequate. Id. However, the court rejected that
position, reasoning:
Even where an offer is noncoercive, it may represent a 'threat' to shareholder interests in the special sense that an active negotiator with
power, in effect, to refuse the proposal may be able to extract a higher
or otherwise more valuable proposal, or may be able to arrange an alternative transaction or a modified business plan that will present a more
valuable option to shareholders.
Id. at 797-98.
This passage can be read in two ways. First, it could be read to indicate that
the board can "just say no." Second, it could be read to say that a board can "just
say no," but only for purposes of arranging for an alternative offer either by management or by a third party. The second interpretation is supported, but not conclusively, by Interco's next sentence which was: "Our cases, however, also indicate that
in the setting of a noncoercive offer, absent unusual facts, there may come a time
when a board's fiduciary duty will require it to redeem the rights and to permit the
shareholders to choose." Id. at 798.
Thus, Interco is a very important, if somewhat obscure, case regarding the availability of the 'just say no" defense.
187 Id. at 798-99.
188 Id. at 801.
189 Id. at 803.

The court stated:
[I]f a board does probe prudently to ascertain possible alternative val-
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In Grand Metropolitan Public Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co. 190 the court
held that an all-cash, all-shares offer, even if inadequate in price,
posed no threat to corporate policy and effectiveness, but did
pose a threat to shareholder welfare.' 9 ' Because such a bid is
non-coercive, the court held that shareholders should be allowed
to choose for themselves. t9 2 Therefore, the Delaware Chancery
Court struck down Pillsbury's poison pill which barred shareholder choice and enjoined a restructuring "spin-off." The court
that was proposnoted the irony that it was target management
93
ing the "bust-up" of the company.

Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp. (Polaroid1)194 arose
out of an all-cash, all-shares hostile bid by Shamrock for Polaroid. Polaroid had earlier adopted a poison pill and considered
creating an ESOP. When the Shamrock bid started to surface,
Polaroid's management decided to increase the holdings of the
ESOP from 5% to 14%. The board of directors approved the
plan without full knowledge of the impending Shamrock bid.
The vice-chancellor found Unocal inapplicable because it
judges the reasonableness of a response to a hostile tender offer.
Because outside members were uninformed, the Polaroid board
did not know that it was responding to a tender offer when it
adopted the ESOP plan.' 95 Therefore, the court applied the
stricter "entire fairness" test, 1 9 6 approving the ESOP plan despite its antitakeover aspects because: (a) the plan served a legitimate corporate purpose in improving employee incentives; (b)
the plan was not controlled by management in that it had mirues, and thus is in a position to act advisedly, I do not understand the
Revlon holding as requiring it to turn to an auction alternative, if it has
arrived at a good faith, informed determination that a recapitalization or
other form of transaction is more beneficial to shareholders.
Id.
190 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
191 Id. at 1056.
192 Id. at 1059. Thus, Pillsbury seemed to come down strongly against a "just say
no" defense where all management could argue was that a non-coercive offer was
"inadequate." This is especially so since the Court viewed the real threat of "loss"
as not being the difference between the $63 that the hostile offeror was offering in
cash and the $68 that the board predicted its restructuring would be worth in a few
years, but the difference between the $63 and the $38 or so that the market price
Pillsbury's stock would fall to if the offer were defeated. Id.
193 Id. at 1061.
194 [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,176 (Del. Ch.Jan.
6, 1989), remanded sub nom. In re Polaroid Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 13 (Del.
Mar. 6, 1989).
195 Id. at 91,620.
196 Id.
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rored voting;' 97 and (c) it did not prevent shareholders from receiving or considering alternatives. On appeal the Delaware
Supreme Court remanded the case in light of new
developments. 198
In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig. '99 arose from the

largest corporate takeover in history.2 0 An MBO bid by RJR
Nabisco's management was met with a competing bid by KKR.
Each bid was very complicated, involving cash and various types
of securities. The KKR bid was estimated to be worth $108 to
$108.50 while the management bid was estimated to be worth
$108.50 to $109. The court upheld the board's choice of the
KKR bid over management's bid because the two were substantially equal, yet KKR's bid provided a potential for greater shareholder equity participation and carried the promise of fewer
divestitures. 20 ' An intangible factor appeared to be the unpopu-

larity of the head of the MBO team because he was viewed as
"greedy" and as having attempted to "low-ball" the RJR Nabisco
shareholders.
Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. PolaroidCorp. (Polaroid11)202 brought
back before the original trial judge additional defensive tactics by
Polaroid in the form of an issuance of convertible preferred stock
to a white squire20° and a $1.1 billion stock repurchase plan.
Shamrock's bid was all-cash, all-shares. While Polaroid claimed
that the bid was inadequate, Shamrock responded that the shareholders should be allowed to make that determination, not the
board. This time, applying the Unocal test the judge admitted
some skepticism "about the general proposition that a non-coercive inadequate offer constitutes a cognizable threat. "204 However, the court found such a threat in the "unusual
circumstances ' 2 0

5

of this case. Those unusual circumstances

arose from a ten-year patent infringement suit against Kodak that
197

Id. at 91,620-21.

198 In re Polaroid Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 13 (Del. Mar. 6, 1989).

199 [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194 (Del. Ch. Jan.
31, 1989).
200 Id. at 91,701. See generally DeMott, Introduction-The Biggest Deal Ever, 89 DUKE
L.J. 1 (The total value of the transaction measured approximately $25 billion).
201 In re RJR Nabisco [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 91,715.
202 [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,340 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 1989).
203 The white squire, Corporate Partners, had advertised itself as being in the
business of helping target management's block tender offers by infusing capital and
holding large blocks of voting stock to support target management. The court took
a surprisingly benign view of this none-too-subtle defensive approach.
204 Id. at 92,223.
205 Id.
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had recently resulted in a favorable judgement on liability. Damages had not yet been determined in the multi-billion dollar
claim. Because Polaroid's stockholders had no way of "assessing
the present worth of this extremely valuable asset, "206 the court
found a cognizable threat to shareholder welfare. Accordingly,
20 7
the court found no violation of the Unocal proportionality test.
V.

UNANSWERED

QUESTIONS

The foregoing cases provide flesh and sinew for the bone
provided by Unocal and Revlon. The basic concepts of the proportionality test and the auction duty were applied in a variety of
circumstances not previously encountered. The new emphasis
on recaps and restructurings required that these principles be applied in new contexts raising new issues. Some of those issues
were resolved, but several remained unanswered.
For example, the courts have not yet determined precisely
what standard of court review applies in the auction context. As
noted earlier, before Unocal two basic standards of court review
applied to target board management decisions. Most board decisions were judged by the standard business judgment rule, a nottoo-vigorous scrutiny, which presumed the validity of most board
actions and minimized second-guessing by courts. A much
stricter test, the "entire fairness" standard, was applied by the
courts to situations where the directors were in a classic conflictof-interest situation. Unocal, however, provided a middle tier.
Because Unocal recognized the inherent danger of a conflict of
interest arising in the tender offer context, not because target
managers were financially involved on both sides of the transactions, but because they feared loss of their positions, perks and
prestige, the Delaware Supreme Court provided the proportion2 8
ality test. 0
Neither Revlon nor any case decided subsequently made
clear which standard should govern the review of a target board's
206 Id. at 92,224. Polaroid was seeking $5.7 billion in damages and had various
methods of calculating its damages that gave results ranging from $400 million to
$6.4 billion. Some outside observers predicted a recovery in the $2 billion range.
207 Id. In so holding, the court unrealistically minimized the effect of the combined restructuring which would place more than 30% of the voting shares of Polaroid in the hands of Corporate Partners and the ESOP.
208 It has been said that the most significant aspect of the Unocal decision was its
recognition that the business judgment rule must be applied differently in the corporate control context. Note, Auctioning the Corporate Bastion: Delaware Readjusts the
Business Judgment Rule, 40 Sw. L.J. 1117, 1126 (1986). This recognition can be
traced back to the Second Circuit's decision in Norlin.
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efforts to auction a company. Once a board decides to sell and
undertakes the auction, no one knows whether its actions should
be judged by the standard business judgment rule, by the more
vigorous Unocal test, or by the entire fairness standard.2 0
Another important issue left unanswered by the courts is
when the duty to auction arises. The lower courts appear confused on this matter. Specifically, Revlon stated that when the
sale of a target is "inevitable" the target board's role shifts from
defender of the corporate bastion to auctioneer. 210 Given that
language, the Delaware Supreme Court in Ivanhoe Partners v.
Newmont Mining Corp.2 1 found that the auction duty did not arise
even though the target's defensive tactics transferred 49.9% of
the shares of the target to a white knight, subject to a standstill
agreement. 22122 On the other hand, the federal district court in
Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc. ,213 found a duty to
auction where a recapitalization plan placed 55% of the voting
stock in management control. Various other cases demonstrate
that the courts were not in agreement on this matter.2 1 4
Whether a target board can consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies in running an auction is another
question lurking in the dark. While courts have held that a board
of directors is empowered to consider non-shareholder constituencies, 2 1" and several courts
have so held regarding target boards
fighting hostile takeovers, 21 6 Revlon appeared to hold that once a
209 Given the difference in the approaches of these three standards, which one is
chosen will make a great difference regarding the outcome of the particular case.
210 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
211 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
212 Id. at 1345.
213 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988).
214 E.g., Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1986),
aff'd, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987).
215 E.g., American Rolling Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 41 F.2d 314, 315 (6th Cir.
1930) (approving community contributions as business expense); Armstrong Cork
Co. v. H.A. Meldrum Co., 285 F. 58, 59 (W.D.N.Y. 1922) (educational contributions approved as reasonably likely to benefit corporation).
216 Most importantly, Unocal held that in formulating a response "reasonable in
relation to the threat posed," the directors could analyze such concerns as "inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the
impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of
securities being offered in exchange." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d
946, 955 (Del. 1985) (emphasis added) (citing Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibilities: An Update, ABA NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON THE DYNAMICS OF CORPORATE CONTROL 7 (Dec. 8, 1983)).
See also Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984

44
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decision to sell the company was made, other interests should
2 18
not be considered. 2 17 However, Revlon was not definitive.
Finally, can a target board can ever "just say no" to a tender
offer on the grounds that the tender offer is simply financially
inadequate? Can it use a poison pill to prevent target shareholders from deciding whether to tender? Or alternatively, must a
target board always produce alternatives such as a white knight
bid or a management-sponsored recapitalization? The lower
courts have disagreed on this matter. Pillsbury,21 9 for example,
was viewed by many experts as virtually spelling an end to the

"just say no" defense. 220 Yet, Polaroid 1221 and Polaroid H222
seemed to revive it, at least in limited circumstances.
This article now turns its attention to a factual summary and

(E.D. Wis. 1989), aff'd, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989) (Wisconsin statute allows consideration of other constituencies); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp.
829, 850 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987).
217 The court stated:
The Revlon board argued that it acted in good faith in protecting
the noteholders because Unocal permits consideration of other corporate constituencies. Although such considerations may be permissible,
there are fundamental limitations upon that prerogative. A board may
have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities,
provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders .... However, such concernfor non-stockholder interests is inappropriatewhen
an auction among active bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect
or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell to the highest bidder.
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(emphasis added).
218 Some commentators read Revlon to completely eliminate consideration of
non-shareholder constituencies in the auction context. E.g., Note, supra note 208,
at 1130-31. However, others found some room for consideration of these other
interests. E.g., Reder, The Obligation of a Director of a Delaware Corporationto Act as an
Auctioneer, 44 Bus. LAW. 275, 279 (1989) ("a transaction which is substantially responsible to a broad range of constituencies may be an acceptable fulfillment of
fiduciary duty at a lower price than one that would ultimately bring down the auctioneer's gavel in an auction breaking up the entity").
219 Grand Metro. PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988) (board
ordered to redeem poison pill over its objection that the hostile bid was
inadequate).
220 According to Professor Coffee, Pillsbury, in conjunction with Interco and Macmillan I, completely eliminated the "just say no" defense. Coffee, supra note 96, at
983.
221 Shamrock Holdings v. Polaroid Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 94,176 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 1989) (approving ESOP transaction which
effectively stopped hostile bid in its tracks).
222 Shamrock Holdings v. Polaroid Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,340 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 1989) (approving ESOP transaction, stock repurchase plan, and issuance of shares to white squire in face of all-cash, all-shares
bid).
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legal analysis of the Macmillan decisions which provide some answers to these important questions.
VI.
A.

THE MACMILLAN DECISIONS

Macmillan I

It is somewhat ironic that the catalyst for the Macmillan II
opinion was Robert Maxwell's failed bid for Harcourt BraceJovanovich (HBJ). Watching HBJ narrowly escape Maxwell's bid inspired Macmillan's management to emulate HBJ's successful
defensive tactics. The chosen course of action was a restructuring (similar to that used by HBJ) to protect Macmillan's independence by placing majority control of Macmillan in the hands of
select members of management.22 3 The final version of the restructuring also proposed a division of the company into two segments-the Information and Publishing segments-as well as
creation of an ESOP and adoption of a poison pill.
On October 21, 1987, shortly after Macmillan began consideration of a recap, Fort Worth entrepreneur Robert M. Bass, filed
a Schedule 13D 22 4 disclosing a 7.5% ownership stake in Macmillan. In response to Bass's filing, Macmillan's management called
a special meeting of the board. At this meeting, Bass was described by management as an especially threatening green223 The initial restructuring was designed to place an absolute majority of Macmillan shares in the hands of management. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan Inc.,
559 A.2d 1261, 1265 (Del. 1988) (Macmillan II) (quoting Robert M. Bass Group v.
Evans, 552 A.2d 1227,, 1229 (Del. Ch. 1988 (Macmillan I)). However, the final version of the restructuring proposal divided Macmillan into two separate companies-Information and Publishing. Id. at 266 (citing Macmillan 1, 552 A.2d at 1231
& n.10). Management was to receive 39.2% of Information's shares and 3.2% of
Publishing's shares. Id. at 1270 (citing Macmillan I, 552 A.2d at 1236). Management's increased ownership was to be effected by management's forgoing the cash
and debenture portion of the recap to be distributed to the public shareholders. Id.
Instead, management would exchange the forgone cash and certain restricted stock
and unexercised options for the increased stake in the restructured company. Id.
The decision to reduce management's stake in the new companies from a majority
to 39.2% and 3.2% came from a desire to avoid having the recap classified as a
"sale" which might invoke the Revlon auction duty. Id. (citing Macmillan I, 552 A.2d
at 1243).
224 A Schedule 13D must be filed whenever someone accumulates 5% of the
shares of a class of stock issued by a publicly held corporation. See § 13(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d). As this article is being written, the SEC is considering amending its rules under Section 13(d) in a way that
would have implications for merger and acquisition disclosure. See Block & Hoff,
SEC Proposed Rules Under Sections 13 and 17 For M&A Activities, N.Y.L.J., May 11,
1989, at 5, col. 1.
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mailer-a characterization that was later described by the court
as less than accurate.2 2 5 As the facts subsequently revealed, this
was the first of several steps taken by management to mislead the
board of directors.
Management, having already decided to create a Special
Committee to evaluate the takeover attempt, began seeking a financial adviser to assist the yet-to-be-formed Special Committee.
Through the advice of its own financial adviser, Wasserstein Perella, management settled on Lazard Freres. Lazard's professionals worked over 500 hours with management on the proposed
restructuring before Lazard's "client," the Special Committee,
even came into existence.2 2 6 On May 17, 1988, the Bass group
made its initial offer to acquire all of Macmillan's stock for $64
per share in cash. The following day, the Special Committee,
consisting of five outside directors, was formally created and assigned the task of "considering, investigating, evaluating and reporting to the full board . . . as to antitakeover matters and
economic alternatives, including the possible recapitalization. 227
The Special Committee met for the first time one week later.
The meeting was attended by Edward P. Evans (Macmillan's
chairman and CEO), William F. Reilly (president and chief operating officer), Beverly C. Chell (vice-president, general counsel,
and secretary), and Charles McCurdy (a vice-president). At the
meeting, Lazard was retained as the Special Committee's financial adviser and the law firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
was retained as legal counsel.
As correctly noted by Vice-Chancellor Jacobs in subsequent
litigation, the events that led up to and followed the formation of
the Special Committee raised serious doubts as to its independence from the influence of management. 2 28 First, the Commit225 Macmillan 11, 559 A.2d at 1267 (quoting Macmillan I, 552 A.2d at 1232 &
n.15).
226 Id. at 1268 (citing Macmillan I, 552 A.2d at 1233-34).
227 Macmillan 1, 552 A.2d at 1234.
228 Id. at 1240-41. Since cases such as Van Gorkom, it has become almost a reflexive response for target corporations to respond to hostile offers by creating such a
"Special Committee." Regardless of whether the committee actually carries out its
responsibilities seriously, it is widely believed that creation of such a committee is
an important element in gaining favorable judicial review of target defenses. See
generally Simpson, The Emerging Role of the Special Committee-Ensuring Business Judgment Rule Protection in Context of Management Leveraged Buyouts and Other Corporate
TransactionsInvolving Conflicts of Interest, 43 Bus. LAw. 665 (1988) (reviewing the usefulness of special committees in light of the business judgment rule); Warren &
Maimone, Special Committee May Ameliorate Conflict of Interest, N.Y.L.J.,June 5, 1989, at
37, col. 1 (examining the powers and duties of special committees); Block & Hoff,
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tee members were hand-picked by Evans. Second, Lazard had
done substantial work with management before the Committee
came into existence, and then was retained by the Committee at
Evans' behest. Finally, Evans and his management colleagues
failed to disclose to the Committee their substantial prior dealings with Lazard, a fact one outside director admitted would have
raised questions as to Lazard's independence.2 29 Thus, it was not
surprising when, at the Special Committee's next meeting, attended by the same four members of management, the Committee advised the board to reject the Bass offer as inadequate and
to pursue instead the management-sponsored restructuring valued at $64.15 per share in cash and securities. Lazard and Wasserstein Perella both presented valuations of the restructuring to
support this recommendation, which would have shifted substantial control of the company into the hands of the four managers
in attendance. 30
Prior to the board's final adoption of the recap, a Bass representative met with McCurdy to discuss the Bass offer. The meeting, however, was little more than Evans' directed response,
which was to tell the Bass Group to "get lost."2'3 1 Following the
board's public announcement of the recap, Bass raised its offer to
$73 per share and alternatively proposed a recap identical to that
adopted by the board, differing only in that the Bass Group, and
not management, was to retain control of Macmillan. Given Lazard's pre-tax break-up valuation of Macmillan at $72-$80 per
share, the Special Committee recommended, and the board
232
adopted, a formal rejection of both of the Bass proposals.
Bass then filed suit to enjoin the restructuring plan.
Given the defensive purpose behind the restructuring, the
court in Macmillan I employed the Unocal test to measure the legality of the board's actions. As dictated by Unocal, the court beThe Emerging Role of Special Committees, Nat'l. L.J.,June 15, 1989, at 5, col. 1 (examining cases that illustrate the effective use of special committees).
229 Macmillan 1,552 A.2d at 1234-35 n.22.
230 Lazard valued the recap at $64.73 per share and valued Macmillan on a pretax sale basis at $72.57 per share to $80 per share. Wasserstein valued Macmillan
at $63-68 per share. Both firms cited the restructuring as fair and the bid price as
inadequate. Id. at 1235-36.
231
232

Id. at 1235.

The chancery court noted the inconsistency in the fact that a Wasserstein representative considered the Bass recap a sale of the company but did not consider
the identical (differing only in that public shareholders were to receive $5.65 per
share less in cash) management recap to be a sale. Because the Bass proposal was a
"sale", its rejection was recommended. It is noteworthy that neither Wasserstein
nor Lazard viewed the Bass proposal as inadequate. Id. at 1242.
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gan by assessing the threat posed by the Bass offer. Given that
the offer was within the range established by both of Macmillan's
financial advisers and all-cash, all-shares, the court deemed the
threat to be minimal. Furthermore, given that evidence showed
Bass not to be a greenmailer as management had portrayed, the
court determined that the only threat posed by the Bass offer was
that it was not the highest that Macmillan's financial advisers believed could be obtained.2 3 3
The court next turned to the reasonableness of the board's
response, holding:
[G]iven the nature of the threat, a reasonable response would,
at a minimum, offer stockholders higher value than the Bass
Group offer or, at the very least, offer stockholders a choice
between equivalent values in different forms. The management restructuring offers neither. Not only does it offer inferior value to the shareholders, it also forces them to accept it.
No shareholder vote is afforded; no choice is given. The restructuring is crafted to take the form of a dividend, requiring
only director approval.2 3 "
Accordingly, the court preliminarily enjoined the restructuring as an
unreasonable response to a minimal threat.
B.

Macmillan II

On the same day that Vice-Chancellor Jacobs ruled in Macmillan I, Evans and Reilly formally abandoned the proposed restructuring and instead began to explore a possible sale of the
company to third parties. While six potential bidders2 3 5 initially
appeared on the scene, the field was soon narrowed to only two:
Maxwell Communications Corporation (MCC) 2 36 and Kohlberg,
Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR). The Bass Group then exited the
contest when its $75 per share bid was topped by MCC's proposed friendly merger at $80 per share. While Macmillan held
extensive talks with KKR, it did not respond to MCC's $80 per
share initial offer. This incongruous treatment was only a taste of
things to come.
Having heard nothing from Macmillan for five weeks, on Au233
234
235

Id. at 1240-4 1.

Id. at 1242.

The six potential bidders included the Bass Group, Maxwell's MCC, KKR,
Gulf and Western, McGraw-Hill, and News-America Corporation. Macmillan H,
559 A.2d at 1272 n.17.
236 MCC was an English corporation controlled by Robert Maxwell, the unsuccessful bidder in the HBJ takeover attempt.
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gust 12, 1988, MCC commenced an all-cash, all-shares tender offer to Macmillan at $80 per share.2 3 7 Based on new opinions
issued by its financial advisers, the Macmillan board rejected the
bid as unfair and inadequate.2 38 In the meantime, Macmillan's
management stepped up its discussions with KKR in order to
reach an accord on a KKR-sponsored LBO in which Evans and
Reilly would retain a substantial ownership interest in the new
company.2 3 9
On September 6, Macmillan representatives met with KKR
to finalize a buyout transaction in which senior managers would
receive a 20% interest in the company to be formed. At this
meeting, Evans offered his endorsement of the transaction prior
to learning what KKR's final bid price was to be. Given this "extraordinary commitment," KKR responded that it would make a
firm offer by the week's end. In response, Macmillan's management notified the six potential bidders that any bids for Macmillan should be submitted by Friday afternoon, September 9.
Coming on the evening of September 8, the notification gave
MCC less than 24 hours to respond.
In this first round of the auction, MCC weighed in with an
$84 per share all-cash, all-shares offer. 2 4 0 KKR made an oral bid,
reduced to writing on the next day, that involved a two-tiered,
highly-leveraged transaction with management-participation and
a face value of $84 per share. In addition, KKR's offer was conditioned upon payment of its expenses and a "break-up" fee of
$29.3 million should KKR lose to a higher bidder. Based on the
opinion of its financial advisers, the Macmillan board rejected the
MCC offer and recommended the KKR bid as the superior
alternative.
Undeterred by the board's rejection, MCC, on September
15, increased it bid to $86.60 per share in cash. In response, the
Macmillan board withdrew its recommendation of the KKR offer
and reopened the auction.
In the next round of bidding, MCC raised its all-cash, allshares bid to $89 per share. KKR submitted another two-tiered
bid with a face value of $89.50 per share, $82 in cash and the
Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1272-73. Macmillan's financial advisers showed a remarkable ability to
issue exactly the opinion that best suited management's purposes.
239 Id. at 1273.
240 Id. Included in MCC's offer was Maxwell's statement: "If you have a financed
binding alternative proposal which will generate a greater present value for shareholders, I will withdraw my bid." Id.
237
238
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balance in subordinated securities. Like KKR's earlier bid, this
one was subject to major conditions, namely: (1) a "no-shop"
clause; (2) a lock-up provision granting KKR the right to buy
eight Macmillan subsidiaries for $950 million; and (3) execution
of a definitive merger agreement on the following day. Given the
slight difference in value between the two bids, Macmillan's financial analysts were unable to recommend either bid. Thus, the
bidding moved into the final round.2 4 '
Prior to the final round of bidding, any shred of evenhandedness quickly disappeared. The deterioration in equality
of treatment began when Evans, in the presence of Reilly and a
Macmillan lawyer, Queenan, telephonically "tipped" MCC's bid
to KKR. KKR's representative, when he realized the impropriety, abruptly ended the conversation.2 4 2 Ignorant of Evans' tip to
KKR, Bruce Wasserstein prepared a script to be read to both parties in order to instigate the final round of bidding. The script
began: "We are not in a position at this time to recommend any
bid. If you would like to increase your bid, let us know by 10:00
p.m.' 2 43 There was more to the script, but this part was read
only to KKR:
TO KKR: [flocus on price but be advised that we do not want
to give a lockup. If we granted a lockup, we would need: (1) a
significant gap in your bid over the competing bid; (2) a
smaller group of assets to2 4 be
bought; and (3) a higher price for
4
the assets to be bought.
Shortly before the midnight deadline, Mr. Pire of MCC called
to inquire whether Macmillan had received any bids higher than its
$89 per share. If it had, Pirie implied that MCC would top that bid.
However, absent an offer higher than $89 per share, MCC refused
to bid against itself. On grounds that he believed any response to
this questioning would violate KKR's no-shop clause, Bruce Wasserstein responded simply that if Maxwell had anything further to say
he should do it by midnight. Maxwell and Pirie "reasonably, but
erroneously" concluded that Wasserstein was attempting to force
MCC to bid against itself. Therefore, MCC stood pat.
Ten minutes before midnight on September 26, KKR submitted a two-tiered bid with a face value of $90 per share. The bid
contained the same three conditions imposed on its earlier offer, but
241 Id. at 1275.
242

Id.

243

Id. at 1275-76.
Id. at 1276.

244
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reduced the lock-up right to cover only four subsidiaries at a
purchase price of $775 million. 4 5
The final disparate treatment of the two parties came when, after the midnight deadline for bids, Macmillan's advisers negotiated
with the parties over wholly different matters. Macmillan negotiated
with MCC solely over some unresolved terms in MCC's bid, refusing to suggest that MCC increase its bid. On the other hand, Macmillan negotiated for almost eight hours with KKR in order to
extract a higher bid. At the end of negotiations, KKR increased its
bid to $90.05, a total increase of $1.6 million, and extracted three
more subsidiaries for the lock-up at a total price of $865 million.
Additionally, the lock-up agreement was structured on a cash basis,
resulting in an immediate $250 million tax liability to Macmillan,
24 6
reducing the net proceeds to only $615 million.
The following morning, the Macmillan board met to consider
the competing bids. During the meeting, chaired by Evans, Wasserstein made several assertions as to the fairness of the auction, concluding that the KKR bid of $90.05 was the higher of the two. At no
time did Evans or Reilly mention that they had tipped KKR as to
MCC's bid. After a closed session, the board of directors decided to
recommend the KKR bid.24 7 MCC then responded by amending a
previously-filed suit asking that the court enjoin the lock-up agreement, the break-up fees, and the expenses granted to KKR.248
KKR filed the required documents with the SEC, reflecting its
new bid price of $90.05. It was in these documents that Evans' tip
to KKR was revealed for the first time. MCC amended its cash
tender offer to $90.25, conditioned upon invalidation of the lockup. After lengthy discussions, the Macmillan board determined that
its previous commitment to the KKR bid was binding and thus rejected MCC's bid as containing conditions that the board could not
fulfill.
The trial court refused to enjoin the lock-up agreement, the
break-up fees, or the expenses granted by the Macmillan board to
KKR. In ruling for Macmillan, the trial court held that although
KKR was consistently and deliberately favored throughout the auction process, MCC was not prevented from, or "misled to refrain
2 49
from, submitting a higher bid."

245

Id.

246

Id.

247 Id. at

1277-78.

248

Id. at 1278.

249

Id.
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However, the court found that Macmillan's shareholders should
have had the opportunity to consider the alternative offer, and
therefore, the court enjoined the operation of Macmillan's "poison
pill."' 25 0 Although the trial court refused to condone the many "deficiencies" of the auction contest, it left MCC only one option-to
proceed with its $90.25 bid in face of the many advantages granted
to KKR that were still in place.
The Delaware Supreme Court orally reversed the ruling of the
chancery court, finding that the breaches of fairness in the auction
process were so significant that merely enjoining the poison pill was
insufficient. The court stated:
When senior management is a party to such breaches and, as
here, has a personal interest in the outcome of the board's action, the process is tainted. The business judgment rule has
no application. Instead, the matter is governed by principles
of intrinsic fairness. The trial court ignored this basic rule of
law and reversal is mandated. 2 5 '
Six months later, the Delaware Supreme Court finally issued its
Macmillan H opinion in written form providing at least partial clarification of previously unresolved issues. The court reminded, articulating that the sole issue before it was the lock-up option "with its
attendant breakup fees and expenses. '2 52 The court further reiterated that, in a case involving not only deception but also "the
board's own lack of oversight in structuring and directing the auction [which] afforded management the opportunity to indulge in the
misconduct which occurred," the "entire fairness" standard of scrutiny must be applied. 25" Finding that the auction was "clandestinely
and impermissibly skewed in favor of KKR," the court noted that
"[w]hen presumably well-intentioned outside directors remove
themselves from the design and execution of an auction, then what
occurred here, given the human temptations left unchecked, was virtually inevitable. '2 54 The court acknowledged that corporate directors are normally accorded business judgment rule protection when
they rely in good faith upon opinions and reports of officers and
experts "selected with reasonable care."' 2 55 But it also noted that
"when a board is deceived by those who will gain from such miscon250

Id.

251 Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 550 A.2d 35 (Del. 1988).

Macmillan 11, 559 A.2d at 1278.
Id. at 1279. The court found the board to be "torpid, if not supine" in its
efforts to run an auction. Id. at 1280.
254 Id. at 1281.
255 Id. 8 Del. C. (quoting § 141(e)).
252
253
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duct, the protections girding the decision itself vanish."2'5 6 Thus,
lock-up options and no-shop clauses, though not per se illegal,
could not survive in the factual circumstances of this case. 2 5 7
In clarifying the Revlon auction duty, Justice Moore noted that
no decision was required regarding when Macmillan was for sale
and, thus, when the auction duty arose, because by any standard the
company had been for sale since the Bass Group's bid. 258 Rather,
the court stated, its job was to determine "the scope of the board's
responsibility in an active bidding contest once their role as auctioneer has been invoked under Revlon." ' 25 9 The court partially answered its own question by stating that whether the "sale" is in the
form of an active auction, an MBO, or a "restructuring" such as that
at issue in Macmillan I, "[a]t a minimum, Revlon requires that there
be the most scrupulous adherence to ordinary principles of fairness
in the sense that stockholder interests are enhanced, rather than
diminished.'

'260

The court also noted that once the auction duty was activated,
"[t]he defensive aspects of Unocal no longer apply. . . . The sole
responsibility of the directors in such a sale is for the shareholders'
benefit.

' 26 1

Further, Revlon held that while lock-ups and no-shop

clauses that draw bidders into a battle are permissible, those that
end an active auction are forbidden. The court invalidated the advantages granted KKR in this case because they did not gain "a ma26 2
terial advantage to the stockholders.That holding led to the court's final thrust-an extension of the
Unocal "enhanced" standard of review into the auction context.
Holding that when a company is for sale, "the board's responsibilities
under the enhanced Unocal standards are significantly altered," but
its "duties . . .remain unchanged, ' 263 the court adapted the Unocal
two-stage test to the auction setting. The Macmillan H court
explained:
256

Macmillan 11, 559 A.2d at 1284.

257

Id.

258

Id. at 1285.

259

Id.

Id. The court obviously felt that this standard was not met in this case. It
approved the concept of a blind auction, but concluded that in this case, "[o]nly
Maxwell was blind." Id.
261 Id. (citing Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986)). Later in the opinion, the court reemphasized that in the auction context, "the board's primary objective, and essential purpose, must remain the enhancement of the bidding process for the benefit of the stockholders." Id. at 1287.
262 Id. at 1286.
263 Id. at 1287.
260
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At the outset, the plaintiff must show, and the trial judge
must find, that the directors of the target company treated one
or more of the respective bidders on unequal terms. It is only
then that the two-part threshold requirement of Unocal is truly
invoked, for in Revlon we held that "[flavoritism for a white
knight to the total exclusion of a hostile bidder might be justifiable when the latter's offer adversely affects shareholder interests, but . . . the directors cannot fulfill their enhanced
Unocal duties by playing favorites with the contending
factions."
In the face of disparate treatment, the trial court must first
examine whether the directors properly perceived that shareholder interests were enhanced. In any event the board's action
must be reasonablein relation to the advantage sought to be achieved,
or, conversely, to the threat which a particular bid allegedly
poses to stockholder interests.
If on the basis of this enhanced Unocal scrutiny the trial
court is satisfied that the test has been met, then the directors'
actions necessarily are entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule.2 64
For the above enumerated reasons, the Delaware high court reversed the trial judge's refusal to enjoin the lock-up, the no-shop
clause and the expense agreements.
VII.
A.

EVALUATION OF MACMILLAN

II

Proper Standard of Review

As the Macmillan II opinion noted, choice of the standard of
review is frequently outcome-determinative.2 6 5 Therefore, perhaps the most important of the unanswered questions addressed
by Macmillan II is the standard of review that applies in a Revlon
auction context.
Macmillan II solidifies a three-tiered system of court review
of the actions of corporate boards. The three levels of review
are: (a) standard business judgment rule protection for every day
decisions; (b) strict entire fairness review where a direct financial
conflict of interest clearly exists; and (c) an intermediate Unocal
"enhanced" review for decisions made in tender offers where no
blatant financial conflict of interest appears, but where there remains that "omnipresent specter" of management self-interest
Id. at 1288 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
265 Id. at 1279.
264
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because of the control issues.2 6 6
In Macmillan II, because of the deceit and concealment by
the financially-interested officer and the accompanying, or resulting, failure of oversight by the board, the entire fairness test was
applied and deemed not to be met. 267 Fortunately for those attorneys seeking clarification, the Delaware Supreme Court went
on to pronounce, presumably in dicta, that in a Revlon auction
where no conflict of interest exists, the "enhanced" Unocal stan26 8
dard of review will apply.
Obviously, Unocal's standards, as originally enunciated, do
not fit comfortably into the auction context. The key question in
an auction is often whether the target board was justified in
favoring one bidder over another. The court's attempt to meld
together the two tests-(a) whether shareholder interests were
enhanced by the board's favoring of one bidder; and (b) whether
the board's actions were reasonable in relation to the advantage
sought to be gained or threat to be avoided-seems to be a sensi2 69
ble accommodation.
An enhanced standard of review is definitely justified in the
Revlon context. The possibility of abuse of the auction process
has been demonstrated in several other cases, 2 70 but perhaps in
none so clearly as in Macmillan II itself.
Requiring enhanced review in a Revlon auction where there
is no obvious financial conflict of interest, says Professor Gilson,
is arguably "overbroad." ' 2 7' However, Gilson justifies the higher
standard of review on two grounds. First, management has a "final period problem" in that errors it makes in selling the company will not be punished in the marketplace as will other types
of decisions.2 7 2 Second, a challenge to the conduct of a sale is
266 Id. at 1279-80, 1287 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493
A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)).
267 Id. at 1279.
268 Id. at 1287.
269 Id. at 1287-88.
270 Many courts have approved auction processes over their own objections to
the "suspicious" o' unfair circumstances. E.g., In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 9991, Slip Op. at 30-38 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) (favoritism to management group approved where court found no bad faith); In re KDI Corp.
Shareholders Litig., No. 10278 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 1988) (approving auction despite
"suspicious" circumstances; In re Amsted Indus., No. 8224, slip op. at 19-21 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 24, 1988) (upholding MBO despite failure to shop the company).
271 Gilson, supra note 126, at 628. Typically, a direct financial conflict of interest
has been required before an "entire fairness" or "intrinsic fairness" standard was
applied.
272 Id. See also Carney, ControllingManagement Opportunism in the Marketfor Corporate
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less difficult for a court to evaluate than challenges to routine
business decisions, especially since the matter usually turns on
the simple question of whether someone was willing to pay a
higher price.2 7 3 Macmillan II is praiseworthy in this regard.
Refining the application further, what happens in an MBO?
The Macmillan dicta is not completely clear. Macmillan H clearly
holds that if the independent directors are misled and abdicate
their oversight responsibility in the auction setting, the stringent
entire fairness test will be applied.2 7 4 What of the situation
where the independent directors are not misled and do actively
structure the auction but in so doing confer advantages upon the
management-sponsored bidder? Macmillan II can be read to require a Unocal enhanced scrutiny. 7 5 It is clear that the stricter
entire fairness test is, however, more appropriate. Macmillan II
was properly skeptical of the independence of the "independent"
directors in this particular case.2 7 6 The numerous cases illustrating the past failure of outside directors and special committees to
run truly fair auctions, 2 77 however, support application of the entire fairness test to any MBO regardless of how many purportedly
independent directors are on the board or how active a role they
play.
In applying the first step of the Unocal test in the non-auction
setting, courts have too often found that a board of directors acted in good faith if its actions received the approval of a majority
of outside directors or of a special committee of outside directors. 2 78 Unfortunately, the automatic assumption that the decision of outside directors is impartial is unduly generous. There
Control: An Agency Cost Model, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 385, 407 ("[U]ntil a bidder appears,
investors frequently cannot tell how their managers will respond, and then it is too
late to constrain the disloyal managers.").
273 Gilson, supra note 126, at 628.
274 Macmillan 11, 559 A.2d at 1279.
275 Id. at 1279-80. On the other hand, if the target management is not financially
interested in either of the two bidders, Unocal enhanced scrutiny, as modified by
Macmillan II, is clearly appropriate. Vice-Chancellor Hartnett used this standard in
In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders' Litigation, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,486
(Del. Ch., June 14, 1989) (approving advantages granted to highest bidder, reasoning that board could reasonably fear that the bid might be withdrawn unless the
advantages were extended).
276 Id. at 1281.
277 See cases cited supra note 270.
278 E.g., BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 475 (D. Del. 1988); Citron
v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Co., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 93,915, at 90,103 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1988); CRTF Corp. v. Federated
Dep't Stores, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,711, at
98,298 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1988), at 98,298; In re Damon Corp. Stockholders Litig.,
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is substantial evidence that corporate boards of directors have
not employed meaningful checks on corporate managers, particularly the CEO. 27 9 The CEO typically controls selection of the
corporation's directors, 280 who, as a result, usually share economic and psychological ties with the corporation's managers. 28 '
Persons who challenge management are not chosen as directors. 28 2 Many directors are chosen for the prestige that their
names can lend to the company's annual reports, not for their
ability to monitor management in the interests of the shareholder. 283 Therefore, reliance on outside directors to ensure the
good faith of board's actions is often misplaced.
These factors combine to produce a situation where the
outside directors' business judgment may be clouded by their
loyalty to the corporation's management. 84 Outside directors as
well as inside directors feel strong pressure to conform to management wishes.285 In the tender offer context, these pressures
do not disappear; indeed, the judgment of outside directors is
sorely tested.286 This is also very true in the auction context as
the benefits conferred on the management bidders in Macmillan
II so clearly demonstrated.
Application of the "entire fairness" test does not eliminate
MBO's as an alternative for target management in the hostile
takeover context. Many times an extensive search will yield no
willing white knight. A management-sponsored bid may therefore be the best hope for raising the premium for target share[1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,040, at 90,871 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 16, 1988).
279 E.g., H. GENEEN, MANAGING 255-57 (1984); E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL,
CORPORATE POWER 38-40 (1981); M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 2, 3, 41
(1971).
280 M. MACE, supra note 279, at 94-10 1. See generally, Seligman, A Sheep in Wolfs
Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 325, 330-35 (1987).
281 M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 14445 (1976). See also Baum, The Job Nobody Wants: Outside Directors Find that the Risks and
HasslesJustAren't Worth It, Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56 ("[T]oday there are a lot of
so-called outside directors who are not all that independent: They are close friends
of the chief executive, or perhaps of the company's banker, lawyer, or management
consultant.").
282 Seligman, supra note 280, at 332.
283 M. MACE, supra note 279, at 89, 90.
284 Williams, supra note 135, at 208.
285 Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the
Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96, 113 (1980).
286 Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 597, 631 n.87 (1981).
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holders.2 8 7 Application of this standard will help ensure that the
auction is run fairly in a situation rife with opportunities for management favoritism.
Recapitalizations and other restructurings involve a variety
of situations including: (a) those which transfer control to management and those that do not; and (b) those undertaken in the
heat of a tender offer battle and those adopted before a tender
offer occurs. What standard of review is appropriate for these
transactions?
As noted earlier, recaps and other forms of restructuring
typically increase the percentage of shares held and controlled by
management. When a recapitalization leads to a shift of control
to management, the entire fairness standard should apply,
whether the action was taken in the heat of battle or as a preemptive maneuver before a hostile offer is launched. Professor DeMott argues for a different level of review for MBO's and
recapitalizations. She contends that a milder form of review is
appropriate for recapitalizations because: (a) in a recap, the public shareholders are not frozen out altogether and can still profit
by virtue of their "stub" shares; and (b) in a recap, fewer valuation decisions giving management a chance to "fudge" occur.2 8 8
Professor DeMott's distinction is well-taken in a recap which
does not change control. There is, however, precious little practical difference between a full MBO on the one hand, and, on the
other a recap which leads to the management group holding only
a controlling interest in shares. The only true distinction between the two transactions lies in the fact that in the recap, the
public shareholders have a continuing (but minority) presence in
the recapitalized company, whereas in an MBO the public shareholders are eliminated entirely. This distinction retains little significance given that, as a minority, the public shareholders after a
recap will be subjected to the will of the majority. 289 This new
minority status leaves public shareholders with no greater protection than they might have commanded during an MBO. In
addition, to the extent that the will of the majority shareholder
(i.e., target management) diverges from that of the minority in
287 Coffee, Shareholders versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporation Web, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 86-87 (1986).
288 Demott, supra note 114, at 526.
289 The majority is, of course, constrained by the fiduciary duty that it owes to the
minority.
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the operation of the company, management will face a conflict of
interest almost identical to that arising in an MBO.
What if a recap does not confer control upon management?
If it comes as a response to a hostile offer and shareholders are
not given a vote, it is a "just say no" defense, that should be
subject to the traditional Unocal standard of review. If it is used
as a blocking device, but shareholders are given a choice of other
alternatives, then the enhanced but modified Unocal standard of
review suggested in Macmillan H should apply.
But what if the recap not conferring control on management
is adopted routinely as a defensive measure before any hostile
tender offer is launched? Because of the antitakeover effects of
such a recapitalization, enhanced review is tempting. On the
other hand, many routine board actions have antitakeover effects.
Can extending enhanced review to those actions be justified?
Although this is a close call, the answer is "yes." In many cases
of the early 1980's, court review focused on the purpose of the
board action, asking whether it was primarily to entrench corporate management. 29 0 A better approach to routine recapitalizations would be to subject them to enhanced Unocal review
whenever a primary effect of their implementation would be to
obstruct a takeover, irrespective of any inquiry into intent.
This would require a new set of questions. A two-step Unocal
inquiry in this context would ask: (a) is there likely to be a positive financial effect for the corporation and shareholders arising
from the recapitalization or restructuring; and (b) is that effect
likely to outweigh the antitakeover impact? Enhanced review is
justified in this context, especially since, as noted above, the evidence indicates that most recapitalizations and restructurings
have been prompted by antitakeover considerations. 2 1 Nonetheless, where there is no hostile bid, even enhanced review of
such actions could not be too searching. It would be appropriate
in most cases, to accept management's projections regarding the
favorable financial impact of the recapitalization and management's fears of coercive and/or bust-up offers that might be
made in the future. In summary, the best approach is aggressive
judicial review, even though in this particular context practical
considerations may limit the scope of that review.
Macmillan H clearly illustrates an abusive case of manage290 E.g., Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 234 (9th Cir. 1975) (invalidating
management action only if its primary purpose was maintaining control).
291 See supra note 116.
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ment self-promotion under the lax aegis of a passive board. This
type of abuse, however, has been disappearing slowly in recent
years, as target boards have increasingly asserted themselves in
order to protect shareholders from management misconduct.2 9 2
The main factors accounting for this increased vigilance by target
boards are stringent court review, concrete guidelines laid out in
cases such as Unocal and Revlon, and liability imposed in cases like
Van Gorkom. 29 3 Abuses such as those seen in Macmillan II can
never be eliminated, but definitely can be minimized if court review is made even stricter.
B.

The Auction Duty

With occasional exceptions, such as PolaroidI's use of the entire fairness test, 29 4 most pre-Macmillan II cases had judged
restructurings, recapitalizations, and MBO's by either the twostep Unocal analysis or the Revlon auction duty. Some commentators argued that cases decided in late 1988 indicated that Revlon
had largely "swallowed" the Unocal test.2 95 As suggested in the
earlier summary of the Macmillan H holding, however, the Delaware Supreme Court has revived Unocal and even extended the
reach of its enhanced review into the Revlon auction context.
Nonetheless, clarification of when the Revlon auction duty
arises is still quite important because auctions are not always required and because Unocal requires the asking of different questions in the auction context. It is fortunate that Macmillan II
helped to clarify the matter. The court explicitly noted that the
company was for sale throughout the events leading to both the
Macmillan I and the Macmillan H litigation, and thus it did not
have to decide when the auction duty arose in this particular
case. 29 6 The court went on to hold impliedly that any change of
"control," whether in the form of an active auction, an, MBO, or a
restructuring, will trigger the Revlon auction duty.2 9 7
In so ruling, the Delaware Supreme Court implicitly approved the earlier holdings of several lower courts which had
Dobrzynski, Taking Charge, Bus. WK., July 3, 1989, at 66.
Galen, A Seat on the Board is Getting Hotter, Bus. WK., July 3, 1989, at 72.
Shamrock Holdings v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 271 (Del. Ch. 1989).
E.g., Coffee, supra note 96, at 985.
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 (Del. 1988)
(Macmillan II).
297 Id. (Revlon's auction duty applies "whether the 'sale' takes the form of an active auction, a management buyout, or a 'restructuring' such as that which the
Court of Chancery enjoined in Macmillan I.").
292
293
294
295
296
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been reluctant to extend the auction duty too far. Some courts
had held that the duty to auction does not arise automatically just
because a hostile offer had been launched. 29 ' At least one court
had held that the duty to auction does not arise simply from a
target board's investigation of what parties other than a hostile
offeror might be willing to pay for the target. 2 99 And Interco had
held that a major restructuring, which apparently did not result
in any significant increase in management control of the corporation, did not trigger the auction duty."° Macmillan II clearly indicates that these cases were properly decided. Any other ruling
would hang a "For Sale" sign on the door of virtually every corporate headquarters in America.
Macmillan II also confirms the propriety of several cases on
the other end of the spectrum which have found a duty to auction
even when a sale was not "inevitable," as in Revlon. For example,
Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc. 30 1 imposed an auction duty when a defensive recapitalization resulted in a shift of
majority voting power of the target. 302 The recapitalization in
Black & Decker reduced the public shareholders' stake in the company from 92.6% to 45.5% while simultaneously increasing the
share controlled by management and an ESOP to 54.5%. A similar result was properly reached in Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp. ,3o3
where a defensive MBO resulted in management gaining control
of the company with 77% of the common shares.
Commentators had argued that a simple recapitalization did
not generally give rise to the auction duty, but that when an MBO
or even a leveraged recap shifted voting control, the duty to auction did arise.30 4 Macmillan II wisely adopted this view, even for
the situation where less than a majority of shares are transferred.
298 Robert M. Bass Group v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1241 (Del. Ch. 1988) (Macmillan I); Lewis v. Honeywell, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,565, at 97,534 (Del. Ch. July 28, 1987).
299 Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 228 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
30o City Capital Assoc. v. Interco, 551 A.2d 787, 803 (1988) (restructuring which
included sale of assets generating half of Interco's sales, massive borrowing, and
the distribution to shareholders of cash and debt securities equal to 85% of the
market value of Interco stock did not give rise to duty to auction; board had duty to
consider relevant information, but once it probed the market and decided in good
faith that a recap was in the best interests of the shareholders, no auction duty
arose).
301 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988).
302 Id. at 781-82.
303 798 F.2d 882, 884-85 (6th Cir. 1986).
304 DeMott, supra note 114, at 547, 551-52.
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It recognizes, as did the chancery court in Macmillan 1,305 that a
shift of control, one of the most important aspects of ownership,
can be produced by a transfer of less than the majority of a public
corporation's shares. Its holding dovetails nicely with many state
tender offer laws of the "control share acquisition" type 30 6 which
typically recognize that corporate control can shift when a buyer
obtains 20% or 33% of a public company's stock, as well as when
it acquires 50%.3o7 Given the wide dispersal of holdings of most
public corporations, 30 8 it is unrealistic to ignore the fact that control can shift along with the ownership of a minority block of
305 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988). Cf. In re Sea-Land Corp. Shareholders Litig.,
[1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,923 (Del. Ch. May 13,
1988) (holding that a 39.5% block of shares gave only "leverage," not actual
control).
306 For a broad categorization of the various types of second and third generation
state antitakeover statues, see Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause
and State Corporate Law, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 473, 478-82 (1987).
307 Indiana's statute is typical of one major type of second generation statute,
defining a "control share acquisition" as an acquisition by a single entity of shares
in an "issuing public corporation" which gives the acquirer 20%, 33-1/3% or 50%
of the voting power. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-17-3(a) (Burns Supp. 1987). Under
the Indiana act, any person acquiring such a "control" share shall have only the
voting rights approved by other shareholders. If the other shareholders do not
approve, the shares remain non-voting. See generally Prentice, The Role of States in
Tender Offers:An Analysis ofCTS, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1,30-32 (1988) (examining the decision in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637
(1987)).
After the Supreme Court approved Indiana's "control share acquisition" statute in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987), a large
number of states jumped on the bandwagon, adopting similar statutes which de-

fined "control" in similar fashion. See Lipman, Another Generation of Anti-Takeover
Laws Beginning to Develop, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 20, 1989, at 18, col. 3.
Changes of "control" are also deemed to occur at levels less than 50% in many
"poison pill" provisions. Such a provision protects bondholders in the event of a
highly leveraged hostile takeover. They typically allow a bondholder to put the
bond back to the issuer if a "designated event" occurs. A typical event triggering
the pill is a change of control, defined in Becton Corp's pill as the acquisition by
any party of 20% of the voting shares of the company, and in Northwest Pipeline's
as an acquisition of 30%. See Heberling, Event Risk Provisions Protect Bondholders
Against Takeovers, Nat'l L.J., May 5, 1989, at 22, col. 1.
Poison pills have long had triggers which also assumed that "control" shifted
at levels of 33-1/3% and even as low as 20%. See Note, Shareholders Rights Plans-Do
They Render Shareholders Defenseless Against Their Own Management?, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L.
991, 1001 (1987).
308 M. EISENBERG, supra note 281, at 43 ("the holdings of many, if not most of the
shareholders, of [the very largest] corporations are likely to be negligible in terms
of relative size . . . "). Eisenberg goes on to point out the well-known fact that
institutional holdings are on the rise, but because fiduciary responsibilities almost
automatically force them to tender their shares, they tend not to factor significantly
in a battle for control.
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shares.309

Macmillan II clarifies the Delaware Supreme Court's earlier
holding in Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,310 where a
special dividend form of recapitalization that financed a white
squire's street sweep was deemed not to give rise to the Revlon
duty. The holding turned on a collateral agreement limiting the
white squire's representation on the board to 40% and an additional standstill agreement.3 1 The court's opinion explained
that this recapitalization did not trigger the Revlon auction duty
because:
[T]here was neither a bidding contest, nor a sale. The only
bidder for Newmont was Ivanhoe [the tender offeror]. Gold
Fields [the white squire] was not a bidder, but wished only to
protect its already substantial interest in the company. It did
so through the street sweep. Thus, the Newmont board did
Even though
not "sell" the company to Gold Fields ....
Newmont's declaration of the dividend facilitated the street
sweep, it 3did
not constitute a "sale" of the company by
12
Newmont.
It is arguable that Ivanhoe was wrongly decided, but the Macmillan II opinion carefully distinguished the case. 1 3 If Ivanhoe had become precedent for standard recapitalizations and restructurings, it
would have caused serious problems. In the typical recapitalization
or restructuring, the Revlon duty should arise from a change of control, Ivanhoe notwithstanding.
Macmillan H indicates that certain other cases were wrongly decided. For example, in Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners,3 14 a transfer of
a large block of voting shares to target management's investment
adviser, Merrill Lynch, did not raise the court's eyebrows simply because there was no formal agreement as to how Merrill Lynch would
vote those shares. The court's ruling was, it seems, somewhat
naive. 31 5
309 See Bebchuck, supra note 90, at 1718 (explaining how, in such conditions, a
minority block of shares can easily control a corporation).
310 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
311 Id. at 1344-45.
312 Id. at 1345.
313 Macmillan II explained that Ivanhoe was a case of "special facts and circumstances [because the target's board] ... faced two potentially coercive offers." Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 n.35 (Del. 1988) (Macmillan II).
314 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds,
811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987).
315 Macmillan not only requires a rethinking of Gelco, it also seems to indicate that
Reder was wrong when he argued that Revlon's auction duty is limited to "break-
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Indeed, even PolaroidII deserves some scrutiny. Vice-Chancellor Berger never mentioned the Revlon auction duty, though the Polaroid restructuring put 33% of the shares in the hands of the ESOP
and the white squire Corporate Partners. 3 16 Vice-Chancellor Berger
rejected offeror Shamrock's contention that this transfer effectively
precluded a takeover. She was probably wrong in this conclusion,
especially since Corporate Partners had basically advertised itself as
a shill for target management 31 7 and the ESOP was structured 31so8
that employee shareholders had virtually no incentive to tender.
This must be considered in the context of Delaware's antitakeover
law which requires the ownership of 85% of a target's shares in order to avoid several barriers to obtaining complete control.31 9
Clearly, Polaroid's management created a strong blocking position
which the court underestimated.
In summary, it is clear that a simple recapitalization will not
give rise to the Revlon auction duty, whereas a full-fledged MBO
will. Between these polar extremes lies the gray area that Macmillan
II has now clarified. A restructuring or recapitalization which results in a shift of control gives rise to the auction duty. Obviously,
all circumstances must be carefully considered in determining
whether a change of control has occurred, invoking the Revlon duty.
Many questions remain to be answered, as the recent litigation between Paramount Communications and Time, Inc. illustrates.3 20
up" cases. Reder, supra note 218, at 279 (viewing it as unfortunate that courts had
not interpreted Revlon's language to apply only to break-up transactions and had
misinterpreted Revlon "to require an auction or equivalent whenever a company is
to be sold or there is to be a change in control").
316 Shamrock Holdings v. Polaroid Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,340 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 1989).
317 See supra note 203.
318 Although there was "mirror" voting, so that the trustee would tender the unallocated shares in the same percentages as the employees tendered, such a small
percentage of the shares were allocated that the employees had virtually no financial incentive to tender. Shamrock Holdings v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 273
(Del. Ch. 1989).
319 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1983). The Delaware law is a "business combination" or "moratorium" type of second generation antitakeover statute and is patterned after New York's law. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986). To
simplify, its thrust is to delay for three years an acquirer's ability to complete a
freeze-out merger and gain full ownership of the corporation unless the acquirer is
able to obtain 85% of the shares through the tender offer. See generally Veasey,
Finkelstein & Shaughnessy, The Delaware Takeover Law: Some Issues, Strategies and Comparisons, 43 Bus. LAw. 865 (1988) (legal issues in hostile battles implicate state law).
320 Time had planned a stock swap "merger of equals" with Warner when Paramount sought to make a hostile bid for control of Time. Time viewed the Paramount bid as inadequate, but fearing that its shareholders would tender,
restructured the deal with Warner so as not to require a shareholder vote. Under
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Non-Shareholder Interests

It is easy to be sympathetic to the non-shareholder stakeholders of a target corporation. There is substantial evidence
that such stakeholders as employees, 2 ' bondholders, 2 2 supplithe new structure, Time would acquire Warner at a significant premium and, as
under the old structure, the new board would consist of half Time and half Warner
directors. It was agreed that the CEO for five years would be from Warner and that
he would be ultimately replaced by a Time executive.
Paramount sought to block the Time-Warner deal so that it could pursue its
bid for Time. Paramount argued that by considering a merger, Time had put itself
on the auction block for Revlon purposes especially since Warner shareholders
would own more than 50% of Time when the deal was completed.
Chancellor Allen of the Delaware Court of Chancery, stressing the authority of
a board of directors to manage for the long-term, stated that a merger of equals did
not place Time on the auction block. He concluded that Macmillan II made a
change of control the key issue. Although the initial stock swap plan would have
placed 62% of Time's shares in the hands of Warner shareholders, Chancellor Allen found no change of control:
If the appropriate inquiry is whether a change in control is contemplated, the answer must be sought in the specific circumstances surrounding the transaction. Surely under some circumstances a stock for
stock merger could reflect a transfer of corporate control. That would,
for example, plainly be the case here if Warner were a private company.
But where, as here, the shares of both constituent corporationsare widely held, corporate control can be expected to remain unaffected by a stock for stock merger...
[N]either corporation would be said to be acquiring the other. Control
of both remained in a large, fluid, changeable and changing market.
Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., Civ. No. 10866 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989),
aff'd, 1989 WL 88712 (Del. July 24, 1989) (oral ruling with written opinion to follow).
See generally Goldman & Walsh, Delaware Courts Revisit Landmark Revlon, Nat'l
L.J., Sept. 25, 1989, at 54, col. 1; Monks & Minow, Time Can't Heal This Wound, Legal
Times, July 31, 1989, at 19, col. 1; Mirvis, Opinion, 3 M. & A. L. Rep. 325 (1989);
Bloomenthal, Time-Paramount- Long-Term vs. Short-Term Value Maximization, Sec. &
Fed. Corp. L. Rep. 57 (Sept. 1989).
Compare the Time holding to the earlier ruling in In re Holly Farms Corp.
Shareholders' Litigation, Civ. No. 10350 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988) (holding that a
stock for stock merger would give rise to Revlon auction duties if occurring in reaction to a hostile bid) and the later ruling in Rand v. Western Air Lines, No. 8630
(Del Ch. Sept. 11, 1989) (refusing to dismiss shareholder challenge to lock-up option and no-shop clause granted to friendly merger partner, functionally holding
that Revlon auction duties applies to a friendly merger where no competing bidders
appeared).
321 See, e.g., Note, Takeover Dangers and Non-Shareholders: Who Should be Our Brothers'
Keeper?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 301, 305 (1988) ("Liquidations may spur structural unemployment and lead to the failure of businesses that had been established
to fulfill the needs of the target and its employees."); Andre, Tender Offers for Corporate Control: A CriticalAnalysis and Proposalsfor Reform, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 876
(1987); Norcia, Mergers, Takeovers, and a Property Ethic, 7 J. Bus. ETHICS 109, 115
(1988) (takeover risk falls "mostly on employees"). But see Grundfest Challenges Argument That Takeovers Cause Job Losses, 20 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 423 (1988);
Brown & Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on Labor, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS:
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ers,3 2 3 communities 3 2 4 and more tangentially, taxpayers 325 all
may suffer when tender offers succeed. Indeed, there is evidence
that the gains to target shareholders 32 6 that occur in tender offers
32 7
stem from transfers of wealth from these other stakeholders,
most particularly (according to Professor Coffee), the employees.3 2 8 Similar injuries may be inflicted by restructurings and
MBO's which are currently encouraged as alternatives to tender
offers.3 2 9
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 9 (A. Auerbach, ed. 1988) (study finds mergers lead to
job losses, but cause wage increases).
322 Highly leveraged hostile offers, as well as defensive MBOs, can have a devastating impact on the target's bondholders. See Winkler & Herman, Takeover Fears
Rack Corporate Bonds, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1988, at Cl, col. 4 (S.W. ed.); Farrell,
Takeovers and Buyouts Clobber Blue-Chip Bondholders, Bus. WK., Nov. 11, 1985, at 113.
323 See Note supra note 321, at 305; Andre, supra note 321, at 876.
324 H.R. REP. No. 1028, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1984):
A change in control of a company can result in plant closings, employee layoffs, a change in the location of corporate headquarters and
other significant matters, which impact on the employees and communities involved .... The Mobil/Marathon takeover battle is but one of a
number that have threatened to or actually have had an adverse impact
on employees and communities in which major corporate operations
were located.
Id.
325 To the extent that some acquisitions are motivated by favorable tax consequences, the taxpayer can be seen as a stakeholder injured by such takeovers.
Although the evidence is quite mixed, one expert in the area has stated that "[m]y
own experience is that very often there are quantifiable net tax benefits in an acquisition, and at least some of them would not be achievable in a different way." Ginsburg, Comment, in KRT supra note 5, at 367. See also Hayn, Tax Attributes as
Determinants of Shareholder Gains in CorporateAcquisitions, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 121 (1989)
("tax considerations motivate acquisitions").
326 A. Shleifer & L. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
33, 53 (A. Auerbach ed. 1988)
("[T]ransfers from stakeholders to shareholders could make for a large part of the
takeover premium."); Andre, supra note 321, at 878-79.
327 See generally A. Shleifer & L. Summers, supra note 326 (a comprehenive analysis of corporate takeovers); see Knoeber, Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers, 76 AM. EcON. REV. 155, 159 (1986).
328 Coffee, supra note 287, at 81 ("[O]ne can argue that recent takeover developments have disrupted a prior system of implicit contracting and made possible involuntary wealth transfers from managers to shareholders.").
329 Stakeholders also suffer in restructurings and MBO's. Bratton, CorporateDebt
Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 95, 136-37
(1989) (recaps and restructuring transfer wealth from bondholders to equity holders); McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 206-11 (1988);
Masulis, The Impact of Capital Structure Change on Firm Value: Some Estimates, 38J. FIN.
107, 116 (1983) (recaps cause wealth transfers); Loomis, LBOs are Taking Their
Lumps, FORTUNE, Dec. 7, 1987, at 63 (HBJ's recap led to suspension of charitable
contributions); Sikorsky, Leveraged Buyouts Punish Middle Management, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 18, 1988, at E22, col. 2 (letter to editor by attorney noting that for quick fix,
easiest place to slash is middle management).
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These transfers of wealth away from stakeholders are tolerable if the majority view, that tender offers benefit society, is an
accurate one. 3 30 It is worth noting, however, that increasingly experts have expressed their doubts as to whether the overall impact of tender offers on the American economy is beneficial.
Professor Coffee, for example, warns that target shareholder
wealth does not necessarily constitute social wealth. 3 1 Professor
Law finds "no credible evidence that social welfare has been increased by any of the acquisition binges of the postwar period. ''3 32 Professor Magenheim concludes that "currently
available evidence does not support the conclusion that the net
effect of takeovers on the economy is positive. ' 33 3 Professor Roll
argues that "takeover gains may have been overestimated, if they
exist at all."3'3 4 Even the Supreme Court has counseled that
"there is no reason to assume that the type of conglomerate corporation that may result from repetitive takeovers necessarily will
result [in] more effective management or otherwise be beneficial
to shareholders. ' 335 Indeed, there is evidence that the tender offer binge is causing a short-term focus by corporations that
negatively impacts America's competitive position, 33 ' a "deSee generally Pound, Lehn &Jarrell, Are Takeovers Hostile to Economic Performance?
Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 25 (an effective summary of the arguments in
favor of the view that tender offers improve economic performance). See also Uago,
LBOs, UFOs and CorporatePerestroika,Wall St.J.,July 19, 1989, at A14, col. 3 (singing
praises of LBOs).
331 Coffee, supra note 287, at 104 ("Shareholder wealth and social wealth are not
synonymous.").
332 Law, Comment, in KRT, supra note 5, at 260. See also Johnson, supra note 1, at
87 ("[T]he economic case for takeovers-largely dependent on stock price event
studies-has not been made convincingly. There is simply too much evidence that
raises serious doubts about the general utility of widespread takeover activity.").
333 Wallman & Ranard, State Takeover Laws Work Well, Legal Times, Sept. 21,
1987, at 22, col. 1 (quoting Prof. Magenheim).
334 Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of CorporateTakeovers, 59J. Bus. 197 (1986). See also
Kuttner, The Truth About Corporate Raiders, NEW REPUBLICJan. 20, 1986, at 17 ("Evidence is beginning to accumulate that the easy speculative takeovers of the '80s
have substantial negative effects on particular firms and on the economy as a
whole."). See also W. ADAMS &J. BROCK, DANGEROUS PURSUITS, 99 (1989).
335 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S.Ct. 1637, 1651 n.13 (1987).
336 Former SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams has stated:
A management spending its days and nights with lawyers, public relations firms, and investment bankers is not spending enough time developing new products, manufacturing more efficiently, or improving its
330

REGULATION,

balance sheet .... The loss in management effectiveness works against

corporate and national productivity, the wages of employees, and returns to stockholders. It undermines our economy and our society.
Williams, It's Time for a Takeover Moratorium, FORTUNE July 22, 1985, at 133, 136.
See also Loescher, Bureaucratic Measurement, Shuttling Stock/Shares, and Shortened
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capitalizing" of our corporations to the detriment of the economy, 3 37 serious damage to employee morale, 3 38 and various
other adverse social and economic developments. 3 9
A strong case can be made that stakeholder interests should
be protected. The real question, however, is whether the target
board of directors is the body to provide that protection. In the
eyes of many, a board of directors is already viewed as a mediator
of the concerns and interests that many entities have in the corTime Horizons: Implicationsfor Economic Growth, 24 Q REV. EcON. & Bus. 8 (1984)
(recalling Schumpeter's admonition that any system that at every given point in
time fully utilizes its possibilities to best advantage will probably not maximize efficiency in the long run); Saul, Hostile Takeovers. What Is to Be Done?, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 18, 22 (decision-making in an atmosphere heated by tender
offers becomes a "mockery of careful corporate planning").
337 In the six years preceding 1989, nonfinancial American companies nearly
doubled their debt to $1.8 trillion while retiring more than $400 billion in equity.
Farrell, Learning to Live with Leverage, Bus. WK., Nov. 7, 1988, at 138. This meant
that in 1989, American corporations were using nearly 50% of their taxable income
to pay interest. Murray, Corporate Debt Rises Despite Worries, Wall St.J.,June 26, 1989
at 1, col. 5 (S.W. ed.).
Many fear that this "decapitalization" of the economy will cause a variety of
economic woes. E.g., Farrell, The LBO Isn't a Superior New Species, Bus. WK., Oct. 23,
1989, at 126 ("companies with crushing debt payments are vulnerable to betterfinanced competitors, both here and abroad"); Henry Kaufman: Corporate Debt Erodes
Competition (interview), Bus. WK., Mar. 20, 1989, at 40 (worrying that shift from
equity to debt will erode competition and stunt innovation); Brilof, Cannibalizingthe
Transcendent Margin: Reflections on Conglomeration, LBOs, Recapitalizations and Other
Manifestations of Corporate Mania, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-June 1988, at 74, 79 (increased debt may hurt R&D investment and productivity); Chakravarty, "When
Everything'sfor Sale You Lose Something", FORBES, Dec. 12, 1988, at 34, 36 (Harold
Geneen sees takeover debt leading to short-term focus); Brownstein, Where All the
Money Comes From, FORTUNE, Jan. 2, 1989, at 75, 80 (some experts fear that a downturn will cause the failure of many companies that have become highly leveraged in
the takeover wars).
338 A. Shleifer & L. Summers, supra note 326, at 52 (takeover experience has led
many workers to lose trust in and loyalty for employers); Karr, The Checkoff, Wall St.

J., Nov. 11, 1989, at A-l, col. 5 (biggest cause of executive anxiety is fear of loss of
jobs in takeover); Merger Fallout: Beware Employee Dishonesty, Wall St. J., Oct. 19,
1989, at B-l, col. 2 (merger mania spawns employee dissatisfaction and
dishonesty).
339 A loss that is difficult to quantify, but is obvious to many college professors, is
the brain drain from fields such as engineering and manufacturing to the less productive areas of law and finance. As Professor Law has pointed out, when students
see investment bankers being paid approximately $126,000 per hour, they naturally
move to that area for a career. Law, in KRT, supra note 5, at 262. See also L. LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET 4 (1988) ("It is terribly wasteful to have
bright young scholars doing elaborate studies of whether prices move higher on
Mondays .. "). TheJapanese seem to be doingjust fine while knowing little about
the fancy financial gimmicks produced on Wall Street today. See Powell, Japanese
Execs: FinancialWizards, They're Not, Wall St.J., Apr. 17, 1989, at A.10, col. 4 (S.W.
ed.).
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poration.34 Many observers on the "corporate social responsibility" scene have argued strongly in favor of a corporate board's
role as protector of non-shareholder interests. 4 ' In fact, a few
corporations already view themselves as being operated for the
benefit of all stakeholders, not just the shareholders.3 4 2 This position is further illustrated by the many cases which have approved the authority of corporate boards to spend corporate
funds on non-shareholder interests, such as charitable endeav34 4
ors. 34 3 Several state codes authorize charitable contributions,
as does the new American Law Institute Corporate Governance
Code proposal.3 4 5
In the tender offer context today, corporate boards inevitably weigh the interests of stakeholders when, for example, they
340 Coffee, The Uncertain Casefor Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 435, 449 (1988).
341 E.g., C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE
BEHAVIOR (1975) (recommending substantial changes in composition of boards); R.
ACKERMAN & R. BAUER, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIVENESS: THE MODERN DiLEMMA (1976); R. FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH
(1984); Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 618-21 (1988);
Nunan, The Libertarian Conception of Corporate Property: A Critique of Milton Friedman's
Views on the Social Responsibility of Business, 7 J. Bus. ETHICS 891 (1988) (criticizing
Friedman's view that corporations have no social responsibility other than to follow
the law); Epstein, Societal, Managerial,and Legal Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility-Product and Process, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1287 (1979).
342 See Exley, The Masterstroke of Managingfor Stakeholders, 13 DIRECTORS & BOARDS
4 (Fall 1988); Melloan, NCR's Exley Manages for his 'Stakeholders, 'Wall St. J., June 16,
1987, at 29, col. 3 (S.W. ed.). For criticism of this approach, see Boland, Shareholders
vs. 'Stakeholders, ' Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 1988, at 16, col. 3 (SW ed.).
343 E.g., Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1091 (10th Cir. 1972) (newspaper
corporation's duties were threefold: "to the stockholders, to the employees, and to
the public"); Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch.
1969) (approving charitable contributions); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199
A.2d 548, 556 (1964) (board justified in considering employee unrest that would
result from potential buyer's change of policy away from door-to-door sales force);
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968) (refusing to second-guess board's decision to sacrifice potential profit to be a "good neighbor");
A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 160, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (1953), appeal
dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (approving charitable contributions).
344 E.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 202A(14) (Vernon 1980).
345 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS,

art. 2.0 1(b-c) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984) (authorizing boards to

"take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business" as well as to "devote a reasonable
amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philan-

thropic purposes"). See Epstein, The Corporate Social Policy Process and the Process of
Corporate Governance, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 361 (1987); Schwartz, Defining the Corporate
Objective: Section 2.01 of the ALI's Principles, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511 (1984). See
also REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 3.02(13) (1984) (authorizing charitable
contributions).
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award golden parachutes3 46 or tin parachutes 3 4 7 to employees.
Several courts are cognizant of this fact and have authorized consideration of non-shareholder interests in tender offer
defenses.348

In light of all this, and, no doubt, motivated largely by an
attempt to preserve local industry and jobs,3 4 9 several states have
passed laws permitting 350 or even requiring3 5' boards of directors in tender offer situations to consider the interests of non346 Consistent with Macmillan II, courts upholding golden. parachutes have
tended to do so on grounds that they served the best interests of the shareholders.
E.g., Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 232-33 (S.D. Ohio 1987)
(parachutes were valid response to target's concern about "losing its key management at a critical time of transition"). Where golden parachutes have been adopted
in the middle of a tender offer battle and it appeared that they served no shareholder purpose, they have often been struck down. E.g., Gaillard v. Natomas Co.,
[Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,369, at 92,428 (Cal. App. Mar. 23,
1989).
347 Tin parachutes are, of course, miniature versions of golden parachutes given
to a larger number of lower level employees.
348 E.g., cases approving consideration of nonshareholder interests include Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Wis. 1989), aff'd on
other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying Wisconsin statute); GAF Corp.
v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (board's business judgment legitimately is concerned with interests of employees and management); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 850 (D. Minn. 1987),
aff'd, 811 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1987); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,
535 A.2d 1334, 1342 (Del. 1987) (differentiating between interests of shareholders
and that of the company facing break-up); TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition
Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,178 (Del. Ch. Mar.
2, 1989); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 689 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(target's standstill agreement was approved, in part, because court viewed as a valid
business reason that it would allay takeover concerns of suppliers, customers, and
lenders); Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp., 675 F. Supp. 238, 265-66
(M.D. Pa. 1987) (reading Revlon as not allowing consideration of non-shareholder
constituencies in auction process, but stating that Pennsylvania law is different).
But see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986) (once corporation goes on the auction block, nonshareholder interests
are irrelevant).
349 Johnson, supra note 1, at 67-68; Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of
Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 96, 116 (1987).
350 See Bryer, Wasserman & Katz, Representing a Public Company in a Leveraged Buyout
Transaction, in LEVERAGED ACQUISITIONS AND BUYOUTs 423-27 (1989) (listing Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin).
A more recent source indicates that 22 states have passed statutes requiring
consideration of non-shareholder constituencies, but noting that their effect is unclear. Franklin, Legislative Toss-Up, N.Y.L.J., July 6, 1989, at 5, col. 2.
351 Only Arizona has required boards to consider the interests of other constituencies. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202A (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
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shareholder stakeholders. These laws are arguably constitutional. 352 Additionally, they may make economic sense, based on
the argument that corporations will be able to attract and retain
better employees, will be able to sign more attractive contracts
with suppliers and will have more productive relationships with
local communities in return for the promise to protect those entities in the event of a future tender offer.353 Viewed ex ante, it is
arguably the most efficient course to protect those other stakeholders as a means of advancing important shareholder
interests.354
It is undeniable that the basic job of corporate management
is to make a profit for shareholders.3 5 ' Despite many attempts by
advocates of corporate social responsibility, there has been no
352 However, they are the most likely of all the second and third generation statutes to be declared unconstitutional as conflicting with the Williams Act's primary
goal of investor protection. Pinto, supra note 306, at 474-75.
353 See Coffee, supra note 287, at 85; Note, supra note 321, at n.56.
354 A variety of arguments have been made to support the theory that having a
social conscience, acting ethically, considering the interests of stakeholders, etc. is
efficient and beneficial for the shareholders in the long run. Coffee's argument about
attracting and retaining employees is only one variant of this school of thought.
See, e.g., Silverstein, Managing Corporate Social Responsibility in a Changing Legal Environment, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 523 (1987) (arguing that what is "right" today will probably be legally required tomorrow and that corporations will serve their
shareholders well by doing what is right-for example, stop selling asbestos or
Dalkon Shields-before the liability piles up); Bryan, The Corporationand the Executive
in the Community, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 695, 697 (arguing that contributions to
charities and colleges will help attract employees, sell products and otherwise benefit the corporation); Low, FarsightedCorporationsFocus on Long-Term Gains, 66 Bus. &
Soc. Rev. 61, 64 (Summer 1988) ("Firms that have demonstrated a commitment to
manage their affairs for the long-run benefit of all their stakeholders will find it
much easier to obtain the support they need from their constituents in order to
prepare for long-term competitiveness."); Saul, supra note 336, at 22 (well-run corporations will consider obligations to stakeholders and might even pass up acquisition opportunities to preserve corporate culture and build a storehouse of
goodwill).
355 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) ("A
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of its shareholders.
The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.").
See generally Johnson, supra note 1, at 39-44 (discussing various theories regarding management's role); Carney, FundamentalCorporate Changes, Minority Shareholders,
and Business Purposes, 1980 A.B.F. RES. J. 69, 97-100 (1980) (corporate law in general has, rightly or wrongly, identified investor welfare with social welfare).
Most courts hold that corporate boards owe no fiduciary duties to non-shareholder stakeholders. E.g., Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
631 F.2d 1264, 1282 (6th Cir. 1980) ("community interests" need not be considered in plant closing); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988) (board in
squeeze-out merger has no duty to consider interests of bondholders); Harffv. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 347 A.2d 133 (Del.
1975) (no fiduciary duty to bondholders). See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Feder-
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convincing evidence of a practical way to delegate to a target
board of directors the responsibility to protect stakeholder interests when to do so injures shareholders. Given the overriding
charge to produce profits, target boards cannot rationally reconcile interests of non-shareholder constituencies with the fiduciary
obligation owed to shareholders when the two conflict. 35 6 Nor
are boards of directors well-equipped to carry out such a task.35 7
To ask boards of directors to assume this role would produce
many problems,3 58 with little hope of effectively protecting non3 59
shareholder interests.
Revlon has been applauded as effectively aligning the duties
of the board of directors with the interests of the target shareholders.3 6 ° Macmillan I properly clarifies Revlon by drawing the
line in favor of allowing boards of directors to consider the interests of other stakeholders only as a means of protecting target
shareholders, and assuming that this is possible only before an
ated Dept. Stores, No. 88 Civ. No. 8460 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1989) (rejecting bondholders wide-ranging attack on tender offer).
356 Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware Supreme
Court, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 146 (1986) ("[I)t is unrealistic to assume that even
well-intentioned managers can choose properly whom to represent and how vigorously to represent them"); Andre, supra note 321, at 882 ("A requirement that managers represent the interests of both groups [shareholders and non-shareholders]
imposes a rule of divided loyalty which would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement."); Note, supra note 321, at 318 ([D]irectors could not "efficiently conduct
socially responsible programs within profit-making enterprises . .. [because] they
would simply be responsible to too many diverse interests."); Mahoney, New Laws
Place Directorsin Untenable Position, Nat'l L.J., July 4, 1988, at 26, col. 1; Note, Stakeholder versus Stockholder: The Director's Proper Constituency in a Contest for Corporate Control, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 475, 501 (1989) ("A manager who is simultaneously

responsible to interests which oppose one another cannot possibly be accountable
to either.").
357 Gilson, A StructuralApproach to Corporations:The Case Against Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 865 (1981) ("Target management has no special
expertise in such decisions, nor is there any reason to believe that the vision of a
just society held by management will be shared by any larger body, whether shareholders or not."); Rodewald, The Corporate Social Responsibility Debate: Unanswered
Questions About the Consequences of Moral Reform, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 443, 462 (1987)
("Many managers may know little about the existing noneconomic social circumstances outside of their particular business environment .... "); Hennessy, The Ethics of Corporate Restructuring, 13 DIRECTORS & BOARDS 8, 11 (Fall 1988) ("[mlost
business leaders aren't qualified by experience for these other responsibilities").
358 Johnson, supra note 1, at 50 (would "cause" a further erosion of shareholder
influence over corporate affairs); Andre, supra note 321, at 883 (would cause abrogation of directors' fiduciary duty).
359 No one has suggested a feasible way of making target boards accountable to
the stakeholders. Gilson, A Fight For the Right to just Say No' to Hostile Tender Offers,
Legal Times, June 26, 1989, at 19, col. 1 & 20, col. 1.
360 Johnson, supra note 1, at 38.

1989]

MACMILLAN II

auction begins. 3 6' However, nothing in Macmillan II would prevent a board of directors from deciding that the corporation
could have more profitable relationships with various stakeholders by providing them ex ante with protection in a time of hostile
takeovers.362
Corporations have traditionally given to charity as a way of
indirectly benefitting shareholders.3 6 3 Corporate boards should
be encouraged to discover the full range of situations in which
shareholder interests can be advanced by protection of other
stakeholders.
The courts have recognized that golden
parachutes-if granted before an auction begins-can benefit
shareholders and stakeholders alike.3 6 4 Similarly, contracts with
suppliers or commitments to communities can also be beneficial.
Certainly, there is nothing wrong with a corporate board's consideration of stakeholder interests in "breaking a tie" between
two competing bids having virtually identical effects for shareholders,3 65 or with a corporation's shareholders deciding to exercise their sense of social responsibility by placing in their
corporation's articles a provision authorizing their boards to6 6con3
sider other constituencies when evaluating a tender offer.
D. Just Say No
Whether or not a board of directors can invoke the "Nancy
Reagan defense" and "just say no" even to an all-cash, all-shares
Gilson, supra note 126, at 627.
Chancellor Allen noted in TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [Current
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,334, at 92,178 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989)
("[D]irectors, in managing the business affairs of the corporation, may find it prudent to make decisions that are expected to promote corporate and shareholder
long run interests. Even if short run share value can be expected to be negatively
affected, directors in pursuit of long run corporate and shareholder values may be
sensitive to the claims of other "corporate constituencies.").
363 Navarro, Why Do CorporationsGive to Charity?, 61 J. Bus. 65, 90 (1988) (corporate charitable contributions are explained by profit motive).
364 Internat'l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447 (11 th Cir. 1989); Buckhorn, Inc. v.
Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209, 232-33 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Gaillard v. Natomas Co.,
[Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,369, at 92,428 (Cal. App. Mar. 23,
1989).
See also Comment, 72 VA. L. REV. 851, 859-60 (1986) (suggesting that providing job security for managers in event of takeover will improve long-term
performance).
365 The RJR/Nabisco board of directors supported the KKR bid over the management-sponsored bid, in part, because of a better deal for employees which
would avoid total dismemberment of the company. See Helyar & Burrough, How
Underdog KKR Won RJR Nabisco Without the Highest Bid, Wall St.J., Dec. 2, 1988, at 1,
col. 1.
366 See Bryer, Wasserman & Katz, supra note 350, at 423-27.
361
362
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bid was a matter over which both courts 36 7 and commentators 368
were divided before Macmillan II. Unfortunately, after Macmillan
H the commentators, at least, continued to be divided.3 6 9
Macmillan I comes close to approving a "just say no" defense, and even enumerates various factors to be evaluated by a
board considering invoking it. 3 7 0 A limited right to just say no
should be granted to boards of directors. The reasons are numerous and complex and their explication is beyond the scope of
this article.3 7 1 What is more important for present purposes is
See supra notes 218 to 221.
See supra note 218.
369 Professor Gilson, for example, sees little guidance on the issue coming out of
Macmillan H. Gilson, supra note 116, at 624. On the other hand, Warden & Feit
believe that the right to "just say no" clearly existed before Macmillan H and continues to exist. Warden & Feit, Macmillan: Outside Directors' Duties and Other Observations,
367
368

3 MERGERS & AcQUISITIONs L. REP. 617 (1989).

Cohen believes that the "just say

no" defense will not survive in Delaware. Cohen, supra note 96, at 733.
370 Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 n.35 (1988)
states:
Clearly not every offer or transaction affecting the corporate structure
invokes the Revlon duties. A refusal to entertain offers may comport
with a valid exercise of business judgment. Circumstances may dictate
that an offer be rebuffed, given the nature and timing of the offer; its
legality, feasibility and effect on the corporation and its stockholders;
the alternatives available and their effect on the various constituencies,
particularly the stockholders; the company's long term strategic plans;
and any special factors bearing on stockholder and public interests.
Id. (citations omitted).
As of this writing, only one case has directly addressed the meaning of footnote
35. In Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., Civ. No. 10866 (Del. Ch.July 14,
1989), aff'd, 1989 WL 88712 (Del. July 24, 1989) (oral ruling with written opinion
to follow) Chancellor Allen approved a merger between Time and Warner that
blocked Paramount's hostile takeover without giving Time's shareholders an opportunity to tender. That ruling could be viewed as supporting the "just say no"
defense, but it arose in very unusual circumstances. Time had planned the Warner
merger for a year, and had very strong evidence that the merger would serve the
long-run interests of the company. Therefore, the ruling may not be strong support for a "just say no" defense in the usual tender offer context. See also supra note
320 (a detailed description of the facts).
Typically, the commentators disagree as to the meaning of this case for the
future of the 'just say no" defense. See Jarrell, A Present-Value Lesson for Lawyers,
Wall St. J., July 13, 1989, at AI0, col. 7 (predicting that a victory for time would
allow entrenched managers to 'just say no"); Dobrzynski, From One Decision Flow a
Lot of Hard Lessons, Bus. WK., July 31, 1989, at 29, 30 (quoting an expert who concludes that case does not approve the "just say no" defense).
371 Indeed, the authors have written another article on this matter entitled Hostile
Tender Offers and the Nancy Reagan Defense: Can a Target Board 'Just Say No?" Should It
Be Allowed To? The article will be appearing in the Delaware Journal of Corporation
Law in early 1990. The article argues against the position that target boards should
be passive in the face of hostile tender offers, and also rejects the more reasonable
position that target boards should be allowed only to run an auction, but never to
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that the Delaware Supreme Court resolve the issue once and for
all by addressing it directly. The commentators will not be satisfied and the lower courts will not be properly guided until the
issue is accorded more than footnote treatment.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Recent developments in Delaware corporate law have been
very beneficial to target shareholders. Unocal and Revlon have
combined with various non-legal elements, such as the enormous
amount of available financing, to replace a regime of target board
defensive "show stoppers" with a new world of recaps, spin-offs,
restructurings, and MBO's. These transactions generally serve
to raise the premiums paid in hostile takeovers. 2 There is a
strong school of thought that harshly criticizes the discretion that
has been left to target boards to slow down, and occasionally defeat, a hostile tender offer. Chicago School economists and
others believe that such discretion leaves target shareholders at
the untender mercies of their boards. However, from a target
shareholder's perspective, it is difficult to argue with a regime
which has produced record tender offer activity at record
premiums.
Macmillan II goes a long way toward clarifying some difficult
questions that the Unocal and Revlon rulings have raised. More is
now known about the standard of review to be applied in the auction context. Additional details are left to be ironed out, but it
seems obvious that a strict standard of review must be maintained. There is much opportunity for target board abuse, but
stringent court review and the potential for liability if fiduciary
breaches occur have combined to improve the performance of
outside directors on target boards.
Macmillan II properly indicated that recaps and restructurings, if they transfer control to a management group, do give rise
act to block a tender offer. Instead, the article suggests that target boards should
be allowed to "just say no" in limited circumstances, e.g., to defeat illegal or coercive bids, to induce a hostile offeror to raise its bid, to effectively run an auction,
and to protect the shareholders in "special circumstances" where even a bid carrying a high premium might not be in their best interests. The article concludes that
potential abuse of the "just say no" power by target boards can be minimized by
coupling a strong presumption in favor of an auction with strict court review. Id.
372 The running of an auction raises premiums for target shareholders. See
Browne & Rosengren, Are Hostile Takeovers Different, in MERGER BOOM 208 (L.
Browne & E. Rosengren eds. 1988); Walking & Edmister, Determinantsof Tender Offer
Premiums, 41 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 27 (1985) (premiums are higher if bidder faces an
opposing suitor).
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to the Revlon duty to auction. This is as it should be and helps to
ensure a fair premium for target shareholders. The combination
of auction duty and the availability of so many restructuring options has helped lead to a situation where experts have concluded
that virtually every premium paid in a hostile tender offer in the
past couple of years has been fair to target shareholders. 7 3 Coercive bids, show stopper defenses, and inadequate auctions have
become largely relics of the past.
Macmillan II also emphasized that the target board's primary
responsibility is to target shareholders. To impose on corporate
directors a fiduciary duty to non-shareholder constituents is to
ask the impossible. At the same time, there are many instances
where a corporate board can serve its shareholders best by protecting stakeholders, and Macmillan II should not be interpreted
to discourage that type of activity.
Macmillan II leaves open the question of whether a target
board may ever "just say no." It does however, indicate a strong
presumption that the creation of alternatives is preferable to
blocking a bid altogether. This presumption, if not a conclusive
one, serves target shareholders' interests by maximizing the
number of instances where they will be able to sell their shares at
the fabulous premiums available today.3 7 4
Ultimately, Macmillan H represents one more step in the slow
but inexorable march by the Delaware courts to create a legal
regime which will closely monitor target board defenses in
tender offers in order to facilitate white knight bids, recapitalizations, MBO's, and other alternatives serving to benefit target
shareholders.
373 Roundtable, MERGERS & AcQuIsITIONS, May-June, 1989, at 40 (quoting William
Rifkin of Salomon Brothers who concluded that "over the last couple of years . . .

[a] lot of the initial bids were inadequate but were countered by an auction or creation of an alternative for shareholders such as a restructuring. But in the end, I
can't think of a deal that was not deemed fair").
374 Lowenstein & Millstein, The American Corporation and the Institutional Investor:
Are There Lessons from Abroad? Introduction, 1988 COLuM. Bus. L. REV. 739, 740
(1988) (noting that average premium for hostile bids is about 80%).

